

A NEW
ESTIMATE
OF
MANNERS and PRINCIPLES:

Or a COMPARISON between
Ancient and Modern TIMES,
In the three Great Articles
OF
Knowledge, Happiness, and Virtue.

PART III.
OF HAPPINESS;

IN WHICH
Some Principles of Mr. ROUSSEAU
are examined.

*Nescit sanè illiteratus, quid sit in se descendere, aut secum
inire rationes; aut quam suavis sit vita, quæ indies sentit
se fieri meliorem.* Lord BACON.

CAMBRIDGE,
Printed by J. BENTHAM, Printer to the UNIVERSITY;
for W. THURLBOURN and J. WOODYER, in Cambridge;
and sold by A. MILLAR in the Strand, R. & J. DODSLEY
in Pall-Mall, and J. BEECROFT in Pater-noster Row, London.

M.DCC.LXI.

A NEW
ESTIMATE

OF
MANNERS and PRINCIPLES

Of a Comparison between

Ancient and Modern Times

In the three Great Articles

OF

Knowledge, Wealth, and Virtue



OF
LITERATURE

IN WHICH

Some Principles of Mr. Rousseau
are examined.

By J. G. BURTON, Esq. of the Middle Temple, Barrister at Law.
LONDON: Printed by J. DODDLEY, in Pall-mall, near St. James's Church, 1756.

CAMBRIDGE

Printed by J. DODDLEY, in Pall-mall, near St. James's Church, 1756.
By J. G. BURTON, Esq. of the Middle Temple, Barrister at Law.
LONDON: Printed by J. DODDLEY, in Pall-mall, near St. James's Church, 1756.

M.DCC.LVI.

TO
ROBERT SHAFTO Esq;

MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT

FOR THE

COUNTY OF DURHAM,

This THIRD PART

IS

Most Humbly Inscribed,

AS

A TESTIMONY

OF

The Author's Gratitude and Respect.

TO
ROBERT SHAFTO Esq;

MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT

FOR THE

COUNTY OF DURHAM,

This Third Part

IS

Most Humbly Inscribed,

AS

A TESTIMONY

OF

The Author's Gratitude and Respect.

AN
A P O L O G Y

TO THE

R E A D E R.

SIR,

I OMIT the terms *kind, courteous, benevolent, &c.* for fear of mistakes. — But as I find there was some small *misunderstanding* between you and me the last time I waited upon you, I think it worth endeavouring, at all hazards, to set things a little to rights, before I run the risque of making them worse by any fresh offence.

What a comfort would it have been, in such an extensive undertaking as mine, to have looked back here, and found, that “so far all was well!” Since I cannot have this pleasure, at least in so full a manner, as I could wish, what can I do better, than try to excuse or defend in some degree my past conduct? For I cannot bring my mind to think, that a mere disappointment is reason

enough to make one either change one's opinion, or by an *explanatory defence* retract the *greatest* part of what one had before been studiously advancing.

I am told then, Sir, that you think I did not treat you with civility and respect enough in my last visit; and that considering the novelty of some notions I advanced, there was a degree of peremptoriness in my manner, which tended more to disgust, than to allure you into my way of thinking. In answer to this, I plead, that though I would not be wanting in any instance of proper respect to a personage of your importance, yet I must at the same time own, that it does not enter into my plan to coax and wheedle. — I have the same opinion of truth, that the old philosopher had of virtue, — strip but off that false dress, which her enemies have forced her to wear; remove only that veil of error, which intercepts so many of her native beauties from the eye; and all men must fall in love with her.

If however I set about this nice undertaking in too rough a manner: — If I asserted with too much freedom the right of private judgement, — it is a mistake, which a little farther commerce with the world will probably

probably correct. And I should hope, if you vouchsafe to honor me with any farther acquaintance, you may be induced to abate somewhat of your prejudice against me, upon finding that I am only a *plain-spoken man*. I must own I do not like that round-about way of introducing one's sentiments with an "If I may be allowed to give you my opinion;" "pardon the expression;" "I submit intirely to better judgements;" &c. Though when I venture to tell you in a much plainer manner what I think, I really mean only just the same thing: "these are *my* sentiments; you have your own; make use of which you like best." If this be not enough to secure me from the imputation of rudeness or want of address; as I would by all reasonable compliance with your humor endeavour to make you my friend, though I know your delicate and fastidious ear would nauseate any thing like flattery, I desire you would understand every sentence in my book with a "*pace tuâ dixerim* *," or
any

* I would not have used this Latin sentence, for a reason you will see by and by, if I had not thought, that by it's *classical authority* it would have greater weight with you, than any thing I could possibly say in *plain English*.

any other still more submissive mode of acknowledging your indisputable right as a reader to judge much more properly, than I as an author can possibly be supposed to do.

So much for this affair.—I am charged in the next place, I hear, with a fault almost the opposite of this last; “that I have treated you with too much respect;” and have supposed you a person of much more reading and reflexion, than you really are: in consequence of which I have passed over many things too slightly; giving only just a hint or allusion to books and passages, where farther information might be had, or which, if pursued even with the smallest application of your own reason, would lead you by very easy steps to the intended conclusion: whereas, it seems, I ought to have done all this work for you. Now, Sir, I must beg your leave to observe in my defence here, that your’s is a very numerous family, in which there must necessarily be a great variety of tempers, and consequently a great difference of opinions. There are some of you, that I have met with; who like nothing so well as the pleasure of the chase, and require only just to have the game put up for you, which you would of choice pursue by the help of
your

your own sagacity through all its various turns and windings. Others amongst you, with a more Alderman-like taste, would have every thing ready provided, dressed and served up; whilst they should have nothing more to do, than merely to sit down to eat and carve, where they liked best. — As I have never heard your sentiments directly upon this occasion, what I have above mentioned being only hinted to me by others; I have a mind for once to venture at supposing you to be one of the first sort, a man of great sense and good understanding; — if you are, the excuse I have to make to you on this head need only be a short one: — I have endeavoured as much as possible to avoid running down a sentiment; and have only aimed at inviting you to direct your own reading and observation to the same point of view with mine. — To gain which end, what likelier method could I take, than just to throw out occasionally a distant allusion, simile, &c. which by leaving room for the exercise of your imagination, might gently draw you into the path of inquiry, which it pointed out? As for your brethren of the other class, it matters not much, how one writes for them. Perhaps the properest way of treating them

An Apology to the Reader.

them is to deal as much as may be in round assertions:—These, if any things, will put them upon a necessity of thinking a little for themselves;—and a thousand arguments to those, who either will not or cannot examine their force, are nothing more, than so many longer and more tedious assertions.

Besides, if an author may at all be allowed to have any regard to *self*, I might plead, that having entered upon a very extensive subject, with abundance of materials before me, it was labor enough to tire one of no very persevering turn of mind at best, to select some leading principles, marshal them in some order, and just say a few plausible things upon each to make them appear not altogether improbable.—By taking more leisure to have considered things, I might no doubt have adjusted my plan better, and have sent it out in a more finished manner; but the time when I set about it, seemed to require something of this kind immediately; and if I have only succeeded so far, as to dispose a few sensible Readers to bestow their impartial thoughts on this question, while it is in agitation; I shall think I have done more good, than I possibly could by sending out a more correct work at the distance of

ten years hence; which would not have been at all too long a space for entering fully into a subject of such large extent.

Another fault, near a-kin to this last, and which therefore may be obviated by a similar excuse, I find has been objected to me, "that I have not gone deep enough into the subject, have not tried, as the French term it, *approfondir la matiere*."—Now, I though I would not be thought intirely incapable of penetrating a little farther into many points, than I have done, yet I must beg leave to observe, that at present I did not affect it, and professed only to treat things superficially; assuming the character of one of those *light Troops*, whose business is rather to reconnoitre and skirmish, than to bear any considerable share in more regular operations. If indeed their skirmishing should bring on any more serious affair, they should be supported by the firmer and more disciplined battalion. Whether it was in my power to have brought any such forces into the field, had their aid been required, cannot certainly be known, as I have not been put to the trial. I must own however, as it frequently happens to people at sea, that, what upon slight observation, or at a distance, appears only to be a cloud or thick mist,

mist, upon a nearer approach is found to be real land; I was in hopes it might also in some instances have happened to what I had written, that some things, seemingly of a very light and superficial cast, might, on being more stedfastly looked at, be found to contain more real matter, than at first sight they seemed even to pretend to.

But how shall I support myself against the next charge; in which I must expect to have every *Muse* for an accuser, and perhaps *Apollo*, or one of his sons, for my judge? — For I have committed it seems, the highest crimes and misdemeanours against their peculiar favorites the *Classics*, and have even been guilty of treason against the *Prince of Poets!* to whose imperial authority, it has been long agreed, every one who pretends to the character of a *Scholar*, must swear all true fidelity, and pay an unlimited obedience! — I can almost fancy, that I hear Mr. *Morose* the Critic reading my indictment; “Whereas you — — &c. not having the fear of certain heathen Gods and Goddeses before your eyes, have prophanely and impiously dared, with malice aforethought, and at the suggestion of the D——, to insinuate that there are any imperfections or mistakes in the
the

the ancient *orators*, *poets* or *philosophers*; and by force of arms them the aforesaid *poets*, *orators*, and *philosophers*, in an unheard of manner, have endeavoured wickedly to dispossess of that fame, which they have now been in quiet possession of for ages, &c. &c. &c." — It is really too terrible even in apprehension to stand this! I must undoubtedly sink under the weight of so heavy an accusation. O that *Minerva*, or you Sir, would be kind enough now to whisper a word or two of advice in my ear, to offer in arrest of judgement! — What do you say? — would you have me plead, that I am no *scholar*, and consequently not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court? That indeed has an appearance with it. — Or suppose I should demur; and appeal to the bar of Reason. — Things, they say, are very exactly weighed there; and even with such a cause, in such a court, I should not, I think, have the least doubt of a favorable issue: — But I wave all these pleas; and, desperate as it may seem, I'll e'en abide where I am, and endeavour to defend myself, as well as I can, by the example of those, whose memory I am accused of injuring.

Græcam urbem non possum ferre Quirites —
said one of their old Poets with a laudable
indig-

indignation. — Why may not I, though no Poet, be allowed to express some degree of dissatisfaction at a City, that is both *Greek* and *Latin*? Who can patiently bear to see people studiously going back two thousand years in search of that perfection, which lies so plainly still before them? — To see men of sense and learning spending their whole time and attention about *Æolic Digammas*, the use of *Accents*, or the meaning of a passage in *Horace*; whilst at the same time they are suffering the finest natural language in the world, their own, to lie intirely uncultivated, unless by the occasional and laudable efforts of some private individual? Had the same been the practice of the Greeks and Romans; had they studied nothing but Egyptian hieroglyphics, we might have been obliged at this day to have travelled to the pyramids to read the classics, whilst all the letters in the world would have been nothing more than the ill imitated forms of men, animals, implements, &c. If we think *they* did right in doing otherwise, and admire the polished languages, which they have transmitted to us, — Why do not we imitate their example? What possible reason can be shewn, why *English*, if it be not so already, might not

not be made by the same care and pains as good a language, as either the *Greek* or *Latin*? And what argument can be used to shew, that they, or at least the Romans, did wisely in taking such pains to cultivate their language, which would not equally prove, that it would be as laudable an undertaking in us to do the same with our's. Superior to them in every other instance, why must we be beholden to them for the means of transmitting the memory of our deeds down to posterity? Yet this we seem fully determined to be. Or why otherwise, instead of using our endeavours to prevent this disgrace, have we taken pains the other way; why have we done all we could to promote it? — Not a coin or medal must be struck in *English*; not an Epitaph or inscription must be wrote in *English*; as if we had a mind to intimate to all the world, that a few years hence, we suspected, our language, like those of other barbarous nations, will be no more! Whilst only the civilized *Greek* and *Latin* shall remain arguments of the polished and refined manners of those people! Who that has an *English* sentiment about him can bear this! How very different did the Romans act, never so much as quoting one
pas-

passage in any other tongue but their own! Tully, we find, even thought it necessary, in his Apology for Archias the poet, to excuse his writing in Greek, lest that should be a circumstance, which might prejudice his hearers against him.

It would indeed much shorten the tedious road to knowledge, if we had but one language to learn, in order to gain a full acquaintance with what former ages knew. The attainment of various idioms and phrases takes up so much of a man's time, that it is not uncommon to see those, who pass for the greatest linguists, know little or nothing else. If this be the case at present, and by any future revolution in human affairs it should happen, that the modern *English* *French* and *Italian* should be added to the number of dead and learned languages, how must one tremble for the fate of poor posterity! — Unless the present period of their lives were considerably lengthened, what chance would men have of becoming Scholars in such a situation? It would answer, besides, many valuable purposes to have but one form of speech through the whole world, one sort of current money, one kind of weights and measures, and perhaps we might
add,

add, one species of Government and of Religion. — It might be no bad policy then in our Ancestors, if they had any such scheme in view, to order Universities and all public schools, as was the custom some years ago, to speak nothing but Latin. But as this Universality (if the present circumstances of the world will at all allow one even distantly to hope for such a thing) can never be brought about by a dead language, more especially Latin, (which we are either entirely ignorant how to pronounce, or it is the most stiff, harsh, inflexible language almost that ever was spoken, and the least suited to common intercourse;) — it would be well, if we could get rid of the absurdities, which the above practice has still left behind it, though now in general long disused.

Had one the address of Swift, or Addison, what a petition might one draw up in favor of our poor *Mother-Tongue*; setting forth the many hardships she has long endured, the various insults, and barbarous injuries she from time to time has suffered, and still is obliged to undergo, from the undutifulness of her own children! whilst every coxcomb, who sticks a pen in his wig behind a counter, if he has but barely learnt his

his *Accidence*, must have his *Items*, his *Omnium's*, his *N.B.'s* and his *Via Londini's*:
 — abbreviates his Pounds, Shillings, and Pence at the top of his accounts into L. s. d.
 — calculates his gains at so much *per cent.*
 — and signs his Receipts,

Per me Peter Stocks, Anno Dom. &c.

I know not, whether one might not join *Madam Lingua Latina* in the same petition; as it would be perhaps hard to say, which of the two had been worse used: but she being a foreigner, and into the bargain long since dead, cannot have so great a right to complain, nor be supposed capable of feeling her injuries so sensibly, as the other.

It might however be a matter of some nicety to determine, where one could properly prefer such a petition. — When one is thinking of a redress of grievances, the first thing, that offers itself to one's thoughts, is the P———t. Where should any thing, that is English, apply for relief so soon, as to that great council of the nation, which has for ages been justly looked upon as the grand bulwark of all that is dear to Englishmen? But, alas! in the present case, the very vote, that should be passed in our favor, would in all likelihood be a new grievance,

ance,

hence; as we should possibly see the honest
English resolution dated *Die Mercurii Feb.*
10^{mo} and concluded with a *Nemine Contra-*
dicente.

As it is a matter seemingly relative to
Learning, the Universities naturally present
themselves next to our view. But as poor
Old English is not reckoned there one of the
learned Languages; that is, it is not orna-
mented with a parcel of *points, dashes, circum-*
flexes, &c. is not difficult enough to require
a Professor to explain, nor eighteen years
study to be tolerably understood; I am a-
fraid any petition in it's favor would meet
but with a cold reception in a place, where
it is not thought good enough to say grace
to their meat in!

As little prospect of success should we
have, I doubt, were we to apply to our
public schools for relief!

Pardon me, O Eton and Westminster,
ye sacred seats of ancient Learning! Ye,
whose wise institutions have lately been *
proposed as patterns for our Universities to
imitate! I do not mean to find the least fault
with your admired plans of Education. — Ye
were exceedingly well calculated two hun-

* Estimate, Vol. 2. p. 66.

dred years ago, to do all the good, that could be expected from you. — Yet I cannot help supposing, that if you were to follow the example of your favorite Romans, you would make some small alterations in your method. Give me leave to lay before you the sentiments of one of them upon this head, with whose writings you are, I dare say, intimately acquainted, though you may not perhaps have attended particularly to this passage.

“ A sermone *Græco* puerum incipere malo : quia *Latinus*, qui pluribus in usu est, vel nobis nolentibus se perhibet : simul quia disciplinis quoque *Græcis* prius instituendus est, unde et nostræ fluxerunt : non tamen hoc adeo *superstitiosè* fieri velim, ut diu tantum loquatur *Græcè*, aut *discat*, sicut plerisque moris est. Hinc enim accidunt et *oris plurima vitia* in peregrinum sonum corrupti, et *sermonis* : cui cum *Græcæ* figuræ assiduâ consuetudine hæserint, in diversâ quoque loquendi ratione pertinacissimè durant. Non longè itaque *Latina* subsequi debent, et cito *pariter ire*. Ita fiet, ut quum *æquali curâ linguam utramque* tueri cœperimus, neutra alteri officiat.” *Quintil. Lib. I. Cap. i.*

I do not mean to enter into the particulars of the above reasoning ; but if the general

ral argument contained in it be a good one, "that it was right for the Romans to learn *Latin* and *Greek* at the same time, and with equal care", I should be glad to know, why it will not equally prove, that it would be as right in us to learn *English* along with *Greek* and *Latin*.

It cannot surely be said, that there are no books in *English* fit for boys to read; neither can it reasonably be doubted, I should think, but that it is to the full as necessary for young minds to be early impressed with the precepts of the Christian Religion, and the principles of it's different professors, as it can possibly be for them to be made acquainted with the absurd systems of paganism, or the maxims and opinions of old heathen philosophers. And would not this end be better answered by the more general reading of the works of some of our best Divines, under the direction of a skillful master, who could point out their beauties to them, than it can possibly be by any catechism or form of prayer, which they are usually obliged much against their will to get by heart?—Might it not also with some shew of reason be urged, that it would be full as useful for Englishmen to be acquaint-

ed with the constitution and history of their own nation, as with those of either Rome or Greece? And might not this acquaintance be more easily procured from Mr. *Hurd's Dialogues*, than from any in *Plato*? Nay more; if it be judged absolutely necessary for boys to learn a set of songs, replete with jollity and tender sentiments; that convey to the mind the most favorable ideas of Love and Wine; I know not, whether they might not meet with some English masters as complete even in this branch of science, as either Horace or Ovid, excepting in one particular of too great delicacy, thanks to our purer manners, to be mentioned to a British ear! They might too perhaps learn the art of managing an intrigue, and *bumming old Square-Tues*, from some modern plays as effectually, as from any ancient *Davus*, or *Pythias*: “*emuncto lucrata Simone talentum.*” However, I mean not to exclude these from their share in this important business; I would only contend, that some attention should be paid to our own language in our Education; that those, who cannot learn the others, (which is the case of more than nine in ten, at least to read them with any tolerable pleasure, or critical skill,) may have a chance of acquiring a little common

common sense, and not intirely throw away eighteen years of their life in the poor attainment of a few latin scraps, which only good luck will enable them to quote properly, after they have got them.

As things are managed at present, many, who come to the University with the character of prodigious *School-Scholars*, are so totally above knowing any thing of their own tongue; that whatever figure they may make in their Latin Epistles for a Scholarship, it is ten to one, that their sister, with the miserable education of a Boarding-School, will be able to write a much better letter to their parents at home, than they with all their learning can do.

And as most University exercises are to be performed in the learned Languages, from whose sacred sources all instances and examples too must be drawn; will it not follow, that many will leave this place to go into the world, fitter citizens for Rome or Athens, than for the Metropolis of their own Kingdom; and will know ten times as much about Cæsar or Alexander, as they do about King William or Queen Elizabeth? Might we not ascribe some part of that taciturnity, for which the English are so remarkable, to this cause, that they really have no language to

xxiv *An Apology to the Reader.*

Speak in, being absolutely foreigners in their own country, whilst the learned part of them in general would be much better able to hold a conversation with a German Commentator, than make a speech before an Audience of their own countrymen?

This however is by no means the worst consequence, attending such a plan of instruction. If there be any truth in the common complaint, that the interests of morality have lately been declining in the world; to what cause can we so properly ascribe such a decay, as to the little care, that is taken, in our education, to teach us our duty? In early days, mankind had little else to study but a few maxims of life, or rules of conduct; which from their fewness and simplicity it was easy both to learn and to practice. When Arts and Sciences began to spread through a larger circle, as they did in Greece, still people could learn the whole *Encyclopædia* in their own language. And even at Rome, when they set about studying *Greek*, as it was then a living language, spoken in a neighbouring country, they could have little more trouble in learning it, than we have in learning *French*. It was reserved for modern times to have two or three *dead languages* to learn.

So

So that during the greatest part of that time, in which the ancients were teaching their children to be *citizens*, we are teaching our's, to be little better than *parrots*. For though it must be owned, there are many good maxims and much useful knowledge, amidst a great deal of a different kind, to be met with both in *Greek* and *Latin*; yet, whilst the grand aim of boys is only to get them to *construe and parse*, as it is called, it cannot be supposed, that they will pay much attention either to their truth or usefulness. What very different effects must *Tully's Offices* have had in a school at Rome, from what they can possibly have in England or in France? Without affronting this illustrious Roman, or his admirers so far, as to say there is as much real knowledge contained in our *English Spectators*, one may safely venture to assert, that if two separate classes of boys were educated with equal care, one in *Tully's* works, the other in those of *Addison*; the latter would have acquired a great deal more proper knowledge for a British subject. And as the usual way of comparing one set of men with another, is to consider, who made the best members of those commonwealths to which they belonged, it may from hence
be

be seen, at what disadvantage we must enter into such a comparison with the Romans; who by being taught at school the principles of morality, and of the government, under which they were to live, in the best authors and historians of their own country, were qualified *ad capeſſendam Rempublicam*, and to fill the highest offices in the state, by the time we have learnt to read *their poets*. And yet if we consider, what a deal of time even they threw away in learning to be Orators and Warriors; that is, to head a mob at Rome, and to cut their fellow-creatures throats, or deprive them of their liberty elsewhere; how vastly might we excel them, by making a proper use of this time, and of the advantages which we derive from the Christian religion, to teach our youth to become not only good *citizens*, but good MEN! Whereas at present so great is our neglect in this instance, that at most schools, where they would be severely flogged for missing an exercise, boys are suffered to practice such cruelties both upon each other, and those animals which are unfortunate enough to fall in their way, as are sufficient to infect their minds with the worst dispositions, as long as they live.

If

If these observations be in any part true; and if a too great attention to ancient languages has been in some sort the cause of it; I may stand perhaps excused for attempting to lessen this attachment. To learn languages in order to come at that knowledge, which is shut up in them, is a right and a laudable undertaking. But to stop at language, as a science itself, as is too frequently done, is a poor business indeed! If any thing could justify it, or make it appear respectable, it would be the attempting to perfect our own by the knowledge of others. And this might in some degree be done, if our own had it's proper share assigned it in our education: by referring alternately from instances in Greek and Latin to English, and from thence back again, masters might teach boys much juster notions of Grammar, than are to be had from a parcel of mechanic rules, suited only to this or that particular language.

That a knowledge of *Latin* and *Greek* may be of service in some sciences I do not mean to deny; that it might have been of more than it has been in some, there seems little room to doubt. But they have now been so well understood for these last hundred and fifty years, that there is little reason to expect any new discoveries from them of
4 what

what has hitherto laid hid, at least none of any great importance. Most books too of any worth in them have been translated; and translations will supply us with matters of fact or common sense, as well as originals. So that the only end of learning them at present is almost merely curiosity or entertainment; and let those, who can make a pleasure of it, by all means have it. All I contend for is, that, since it's use has in a great measure ceased, it should not be forced upon those, by a faulty plan of education, who can have no relish for it, and who, in the mean time, might have been making a considerable progress in real knowledge without it *.

If every practice, that is old, be therefore right, we might easily refer to a time, when all men, who pretended to be scholars, traveled
into

* What is here said, is not meant to condemn the study of *the Classics*, but only to limit it a little. They, who could do it to any purpose, would always follow it without it's being made the business of every body. — We have no general institution for teaching the Mathematics; yet we have as many and as able mathematicians, as can well be desired. It would indeed be exceedingly hard to shew the necessity of teaching any thing, as a general science to all boys whatever, except that, which is never taught them as a science at all; I mean the knowledge of themselves and of their duty.

into Egypt: and after that, to Athens. Why do not they go there now? It might as easily be shewn, that no alteration had happened in these celebrated seats of ancient learning, as that none had happened in the circumstances of the world, since the present plan of education was established. I am aware however, that the usual answer to all schemes of improvement is, that we should leave these matters to those, who are immediately concerned in them; who by the bye are commonly so well satisfied with the present system, as to be the last men in the world, from whom one may reasonably expect any alteration. There is indeed another much better answer than this, "That we go on very well in the present method;" which no doubt every one must be glad to observe:—but at the same time there cannot surely be any harm in wishing to see things better; and this is all, that I would be understood to mean.

Perhaps it may be said, that if there really be any thing amiss in this matter, it is an evil which time of itself will cure. And I am willing to hope indeed, if men have any foundation at all for their outcry about the decline of *learning*, it has arisen only from a suspicion, that the *learned languages* are not so much attended to, as they used to be.

If

xxx *An Apology to the Reader.*

If time however be really taking away a little from this part of our education, we ought at least to supply its absence by the substitution of something else in its room.

As to those few occasional strictures, which I threw out against Homer and some others of the Ancients, I did not mean to propose them as complete arguments for the truth of what I was advancing; but I was in hopes they might have stimulated some of their doughty champions to enter into a closer examination of their merits, than is commonly made. By that partial method of admiring their striking beauties conveyed down, now for ages, from master to scholar by nodding head and waving hand, whilst every thing of a different kind is passed over without notice; how can we ever know their proper value? If the same thing, which is called a fault, a blemish, or even nonsense and absurdity in *English*, be honored in *Latin* and *Greek* with the title of an *Hypallage*, a *Catachresis*, or of some other fine figure, how should people ever form a fair judgement?—Is it not from hence, that my good friends the Critics (by the bye, if this does not succede in the direct sense, I desire it may be understood as a *catachresis*, an *ironicè dictum*, or

some

(some such beautiful trope) look upon it as the highest commendation they can pay to those modern authors, whom they deign to think a little better of than common; to say, that they have happily followed, in their compositions, those perfect models, the Ancients? * Whereas the truth is, we have hardly any thing worth reading, except a little poetry, which bears any resemblance at all to them, beyond a few names, either in the matter or in the manner. Whose models in the name of common sense, did NEWTON, LOCKE, or MONTESQUIEU follow? Upon whose plan did BACON build? What ancient did SHAKESPEAR imitate? Or whom amongst them all, though he was their professed admirer, did ADDISON take for his pattern, when he wrote his SPECTATORS? Nay,

* It is pleasant enough to find people excusing the want of delicacy, and such other little faults, as they allow the ancients to have, by the Times in which they wrote; and yet fancying, that those times far exceeded our's in every instance whatever. Happy Prejudice, with how little reason art thou satisfied! — I would beg leave to observe here, that it is no proof in favor of the ancients, that those who have not read their works, do not write correctly even in their own language; because such people have commonly no opportunity of studying any language at all, at least scientifically; and it certainly is of some little use in writing to be acquainted with Grammar in some language or other.

ixxii . . . *An Apology to the Reader.*

Nay, as if nothing could be good, though it came from heaven itself, which did not answer this test of perfection, some pains have been taken to prove, that even CHRIST and his APOSTLES were good and sound *Classics!* It seems however, as if what I had said, with a design of bringing on a fairer examination into the merits of these ancients, had been either so little, or so much, as to defeat my intention; so little, as not to deserve any notice; or so much, as answered itself by shewing, it was too much to be true. Some other method then must probably be tried to set these matters in a better light.

My motive for having affected to mix a little ridicule with these strictures, had it's rise principally from considering, what use the wits of the last age had made of this weapon against a kind of predecessor of mine, the worthy *W. Wotton* B.D. at whose expence many a one has laughed, who never read his works. I had a mind therefore to shew, that there was some room for laughing even on the other side. How successfully I might manage this point, I know not; I am sure however, I did it sparingly.

But it seems, there is such an air of levity running through the whole of what I have written, that both you and others have doubted,
ed,

ed, whether I was in jest or earnest; — I take this opportunity therefore to assure you all, that I was most seriously and heartily convinced of the general truth of what I was advancing; and it was owing intirely to my diffidence and fears of not being able to keep up a proper dignity throughout, that in particular places, where I most suspected the propriety of what I was saying, I endeavoured to make you smile a little; in hopes you might by that means be inclined to pass over, in a better humor, what otherwise wou'd perhaps have excited a frown from you. If this betrayed me into any unlucky combination of the serio-jocose at improper times, I can only say, it was not intended to give any offence; and I shall take particular care to avoid it for the future, even at the dangerous risque of being reckoned dull.

As to style; I believe I must own the charge, which is brought against me on this head; “that I have not in many instances raised the manner of expressing myself much above the pitch of common conversation.” The “*sermoni propiora*” do not indeed appear to me so faulty in prose, as they do in poetry. To my thinking, I must confess, it

xxxiv *An Apology to the Reader.*

seems in general so much more natural to walk upon one's own feet, than either in stilts or buskins, that I must have done a violence to my own feelings to have given into that staking method of delivering one's sentiments, so happily practiced by some, and so highly praised by others! Whatever advantages I might have derived from hence, I freely leave them all to the heroes of Tragedy; which the *great Critic* has long ago determined to be a business suited to this purpose, “ογκηρον φησιν και επιδεχομενον σομφον”. However, as these papers were thrown together originally in a different form from what they now appear in; and one cannot always persuade one's self to strip off that dress, which one's thoughts have once put on; you may perhaps in some places be inclined to think, there is too much of the spirit of declamation interspersed, to agree well with the sobriety of calm dissertation.

After having detained you so long, Sir, in making an APOLOGY to you, it would be needless to add, that I should have been extremely happy to have had no occasion for it. You cannot but see from hence, how very desirous I am of having your good opinion; — if however, after all I can say in
my

An Apology to the Reader. xxxv

my defence, I am still so unlucky, as not to make you think more favorably of me; though I may not perhaps be able to arrive at that enviable serenity of mind, which they were blessed with, who, according to the poet, were, "*Quicquid scripsere, beati*;" yet I will endeavour to be as little *unhappy*, as I can, whatever you may be pleased to think, either of me or my manner of writing.

I am, S I R,

and shall be,

according to the degree of civility,

with which you may condescend to treat me,

your humble,

very humble,

or most obedient humble

Servant,

March 18. 1761.

The AUTHOR.

An Apology to the Reader.

my defence I am still as unlucky, as not to
make you think more favorably of me;
though I may not perhaps be able to arrive
at that enviable serenity of mind, which they
were blessed with, who, according to the poet,
were "Ourselves to see, and yet I will
endeavour to be as little unhappy as I can,
whatever you may be pleased to think
other of me or my manner of writing."

CONTENTS

A NEW
ESTIMATE
OF
MANNERS and PRINCIPLES.

PART III.
OF HAPPINESS;

IN WHICH
Some Principles of Mr. ROUSSEAU
are examined.

A NEW
ESTIMATE
OF
MANNERS and PRINCIPLES.

PART III.
OF HAPPINESS;

IN WHICH
Some Principles of Mr. Rousseau
are examined.

CONTENTS.

PART III.

CHAP. I.

OF the Connexion between Knowledge, Happiness, and Virtue. p. i

CHAP. II.

Mr. Rousseau's Opinion; with some Observations upon it, drawn from the seeming Designs of Nature, as expressed in the Constitution of Things. p. 12

CHAP. III.

The Happiness of Social and Savage Life compared. p. 34

CHAP. IV.

Of Improvements in Civil Life. p. 39

CHAP. V.

Of the Patriarchal, Grecian, and Roman Governments. p. 56

Of

CONTENTS.

Of Happiness.

p. 94

CHAP. VII.

Of an Equality in Happiness.

p. 115

CHAP. VIII.

Of what is called the State of Nature.

p. 118

CHAP. I.

Of the Connection between Knowledge, Happiness, and Virtue.

CHAP. II.

Of the Necessity of Opinions with some Observations upon its, drawn from the former Description of Nature, as expressed in the Constitution of Things.

CHAP. III.

Of the Happiness of Social and Savage Life compared.

CHAP. IV.

Of Improvements in Civil Life.

CHAP. V.

Of the Patriarchal, Grecian, and Roman Governments.

A NEW
ESTIMATE
OF
MANNERS and PRINCIPLES.

PART III.
Of HAPPINESS.

CHAP. I.

*Of the Connexion between Knowledge, Happiness,
and Virtue.*

IT was the business of the preceding part of this Estimate to prove, "That knowledge is in a state of much greater perfection now, than it formerly was." It is the design of this to shew, "That, in consequence of such an improvement, the state of man's happiness also must have been considerably advanced."

And surely, one should think, if the former part was at all satisfactorily made out, there cannot much difficulty remain in proving

* A

ing

ing the latter. Nay, if the first proposition was only so far evinced, as to make it seem probable, that at least those Branches * of Knowledge, which apparently have a more immediate influence upon the welfare of civil life, and man's comfortable subsistence in it, were improved; if it should appear,
I say,

* The Branches of Science here intended are principally Politics, Ethics, Religion, and Commerce.

As there may be many, to whom an improvement in the above particulars was not clearly enough shewn, in the few slight observations, which I ventured to lay before them in the former parts of this essay; I should hope at least, that they might be inclined to examine a little farther into the subject themselves. And if they would only take the trouble of instituting a more accurate comparison, from their own reading, between the *Politics* of PLATO and ARISTOTLE on the one side, and those of SIDNEY, LOCKE, and MONTESQUIEU on the other. — If they would collect as much of ancient *Ethics*, as they please, and then in balance to the information, which they would derive from thence, only throw into the opposite scale the *reasoning, good sense, and humanity* to be met with in the single short volume of WOLLASTON'S RELIGION OF NATURE. — If they would turn over a few of the voluminous and ponderous WORKS of the FATHERS, and compare the notions, which they would find there with such as might be extracted from some of the most able performances of our MODERN DIVINES, — they would soon, I dare say, receive all the satisfaction in these matters, which I could wish them to have. For as to *Commerce*, there cannot, I take it for granted, be the least dispute about it.

Manners and Principles. 3

I say, that we are wiser only in these instances, even allowing the Ancients to excel us in Eloquence and Poetry, who would hesitate in concluding, that we were happier than they? This indeed seems to follow of course, as a corollary, plainly deducible from a proposition already demonstrated.

For let it once be established as a truth, that the science of *Politics*, for example, is improved; who could want to be informed, that men would have a clearer insight into the rights, privileges, and interests of their species; and that by this means lawgivers would be better enabled to frame their different systems in such a manner, as should most effectually answer the end of all government, the general happiness of those who live under it? The just limits between power and obedience, would be more accurately traced out, and more precisely determined; the odious and dangerous quality of the one, would be lessened by a proper distribution of it into various channels; and the irksomeness of the other would be abated and rendered less disagreeable, by a suitable mixture of liberty with it.

As little need surely can there be to prove, by any length of argument, that in propor-

tion as the grounds and principles of *Morality* were better explained, men would comprehend more fully the duties, which they owed both to themselves and others; for the discharge of which duties, *Religion*, in it's turn, as it was better understood, would furnish, if not stronger *, at least more rational and more proper obligations; whilst, by banishing absurd notions and idle apprehensions, it would render it's professors both better members of the community, and more friendly neighbours to each other.

In the last place, who must not see, that *Commerce*, as it became more extensive, would discover a greater variety of such arts and means as tend to better our condition; to improve our accommodations; and to raise the dignity and value of human life far above the standard of those times, when mankind had barely learnt to live, in a way little preferable to that, in which the beasts of the forest draw out their existence?

In short, the whole of this reasoning may be comprized in this single question; whether

* This exception is made, because it is perhaps possible for Enthusiasm and Superstition to propose to their votaries as strong motives for the observance of their absurd injunctions, as Truth itself can do to those, who live under it's better influence.

ther, as rational creatures, we shall not be likely to act more agreeably to that character, as our minds are better cultivated, and our reason more improved? which surely cannot be regarded as any very intricate inquiry, or one that can cost much study to resolve!

For if Happiness be the grand end and aim of all our wishes and endeavours; the more perfectly we know where it is to be found, and the more clearly we discover the paths, which lead to it; the more probable undoubtedly it is, unless there be something exceedingly perverse indeed in our fate, that we shall pursue our interest with a greater degree of steadiness and success.

And if our Reason was assigned us by nature for a guide, to lead us to our happiness; surely the more knowledge this guide acquires from observation and experience; the better able will he be to conduct us properly: and the more proofs and trials we have of his skill and abilities, the more ready shall we be to trust ourselves to his guidance.

Lastly, if the road, which this guide will point out to us, should be, as it certainly will be, the path of Virtue; how can it be otherwise, but that we should in such circumstances be more likely, than if we were

in doubt about it, to enter upon this path with chearfulness, and pursue it with perseverance to the end, however unpleasant or unpromising it may now and then appear in some more tedious stages of our journey?

Since nothing more is asserted here, than a greater degree of probability; it is not necessary, that we should see what is above laid down always taking place: such exceptions however to this rule; as particularly respect Virtue, must be considered hereafter. In the mean time we may just observe, that as man is endued with free-will, which is often hardy enough to assert it's privilege, and exercise it's power in direct contradiction to his reason, and in open violation of his happiness; it is possible that some, who are well acquainted with their duty in theory, may act in particular cases, as if they were the greatest strangers to it. And by such various humors are most of us possessed, arising both from the nature of our own complex frame, and those fickle, fluctuating circumstances, in which we are placed; that many, who seem blessed with the fairest means of happiness, may, by an almost unaccountable kind of whim and caprice, not only neglect to use them,

Manners and Principles.

them, but even contrive to turn them into materials for uneasiness and misery.*

How-

* Besides the danger to be apprehended from these irregularities, threatening so much to disturb the good harmony, which I would willingly establish between Knowledge, Happiness and Virtue, (an alliance, could it be perfectly brought about, of greater consequence to the peace of the world, than any triple alliance that ever yet was formed!) — There are Some, I am afraid, such too as would generally be thought *to know the world*, who only observing, how a man often *makes his way in life*, may be inclined to entertain very different notions of learning and good sense (which are besides not always to be found united) from those, which I could wish to have believed the true ones. It may not be amiss therefore to try, if we can free the present argument from any objection, likely to be brought against it from this quarter.

It would be a consideration highly alarming to the interests both of Knowledge and of Virtue, to think, that they did not, in their general tendency, promote our present advantage. But however common it may be to measure a man's happiness, and even his understanding, by what is called *success in the world*, yet one might fairly, I should think, dispute the justness of this standard.

Allowing Wealth and Honor to have all the real worth, which They, who are pursuing them, imagine them to have; yet who can say, that it might not greatly injure the happiness of a philosopher at least, who may be supposed to have many other things in view equally interesting to him, and to the full as essential to his happiness, deeply to engage in the pursuit of these? Might he not find it necessary, in the course of this pursuit, to pay so much attention to the hu-

However, if it be the natural tendency of improved science to make men happier and better; it is a warrantable conclusion to say, that
mors and foibles of others, that in the mean time he must neglect his own? If he should be further obliged to make himself so much their servant, as to cease in a great degree to be his own master; (in which the truest happiness most probably consists,) who could fairly reckon, whatever his success might be, that he was upon the whole a gainer?

Neither would it be a more equitable decision to conclude, he had less understanding than others, merely because he had been less successful, than they, in obtaining some worldly advantages; as these might be matters, to which he only occasionally bent his thoughts, whilst they were making them the constant objects of their study and attention. There are besides in the present circumstances of our Being certain subsidiary arts, of no little consequence in some instances to a man's advancement, which he might not trouble himself to learn; either because he thought them unworthy of his notice, or that his other stock of merit was so great, as would be sufficient of itself to recommend him, without their aid.

It is possible however, that those, who have the brightest parts, may not in some respects be so well calculated to make their way in the world, as others. For in the road either to wealth or honor, the swiftest couriers are by no means the best travellers. There is a certain, even, steady pace, which in these pursuits will bring us to our journey's end much more prosperously, than any occasional and sudden speed; and they, who have a high-mettled fancy to deal with, will not always have it enough under command to make it drudge on in the common road, and at the
the

Manners and Principles.

9

that the effect in general, will be correspondent; though the imprudence or ill success of a few individuals should incline one to think,

the ordinary rate: carried away by the starts and fallies of such a wayward and unmanaged steed, they may sometimes be led even against their own best endeavours into untrodden and embarrassed paths; a circumstance, which must needs render their passage tedious and unpleasant, and throw them far behind those, who keep on in the beaten way; though by opening a new view of things, it may to after-comers be attended with many advantages.

One might reckon up too some other inconveniences attending men of abilities, which having their origin from the necessary imperfection of human nature are not likely soon to be remedied. To say nothing of those constant enemies to all excellence, the perverse children of malice or of envy; the fears of the weak, and the cunning of the crafty, both naturally dispose them to be suspicious: and they who have shewn some talents, will always be looked at by these with a degree of caution and jealousy, as persons who are hatching schemes, and harbouring intentions, beyond what is seen (for what will not suspicion fancy!) of a most dangerous and malignant tendency, highly detrimental to the common good, and likely to overthrow the fairest fabric of publick tranquillity! Hence they will not only be subject to much ill-grounded censure, which others of less eminence are free from; but they must also expect to meet with many obstacles purposely placed in every avenue, by which otherwise they might probably arrive at too high an estimation. Whilst every motion then of such men is cautiously watched by their enemies, and through their suggestions distantly suspected perhaps even by
their

think, that they were neither happier nor better for their knowledge; especially as many of these supposed instances to the contrary,

their friends; it cannot but frequently happen, that many of much less pretensions, being suffered to pass by with a slighter observation, will obtain their end, even before it is suspected, they had any such design in view. But were these disagreeable considerations of much more importance, than they are, being in general only so many Lilliputian darts, which will rather annoy than wound a man of any constancy; I should make no doubt, but that the extensive view of things, which the true sons of science are blessed with, would bring in such a stock of perpetual pleasure, as would be enough to overbalance any occasional uneasiness or mortification, they might be liable to on this account.

As to that complaint, the usual offspring of disappointment, "that men in high stations do not regard merit in the distribution of their favours"; were it much better founded, than it commonly is, being little else in general but an instance of self-applause, over-rating the pretensions of those, who make it; might we not easily solve the occasion of it from principles entirely consistent both with the neglected worth of those, who are hurt by it, and the justice of those, whose mistaken conduct has given rise to it? Some unforeseen, and perhaps unaccountable coincidence of circumstances, which we for want of knowing more about them call accident, must unavoidably have a great share in determining the fortunes of particular men. The soldier, who in the attack of Quebec, followed a fortunate companion, who had discovered a way to climb the dangerous steep, might easily by his direction and assistance get up the difficult ascent; whilst many others of equal strength

Manners and Principles. 11

trary, may arise merely from mistaken notions in those, who declare them such; who perhaps are only led to think of them, as they do, from their own false measures of what constitutes true knowledge, solid happiness, and real virtue.

strength and courage, by being landed in a less lucky spot, might be prevented from making the least approach. Besides, can we reasonably suppose, that the Great should be exempt from all partial affections, and that they should entertain no friendships? As well might we imagine, that they should cease to be men! And will not these naturally incline them to think more favourably of such as have always shewn an attachment to them, and who by being frequently with them have opportunities of recommending themselves, which others cannot have? How should they avoid then giving some sort of preference to these above others, even though more deserving, when they bestow those envied favours, which fortune has put in their power? Especially as their situation must almost necessarily prevent them from knowing many of those, whose merit, however eminent, may be placed at too great a distance for their notice! How should the lofty oak, surrounded by his tall fellows of the grove, discern the humble shrub, that grows in some distant vale, however it may be regarded either for its use or worth within its own narrow sphere? What wonder can it be, if sometimes the creeping ivy, however meanly it may be thought of, which accidentally lays hold of his stem, should by degrees wind itself into so close a connection with him, as to rise by his support into an eminence it never was designed for?

CHAP.

21 *A new Estimate of*

CHAP. II.

Mr. Rousseau's Opinion; with some Observations upon it, drawn from the seeming Designs of Nature, as expressed in the Constitution of Things.

IT has been asserted in the last chapter, that it was the natural tendency of improved science to make man's life happier and better; and the assertion seems to be justified not only by the reasons there offered in support of it, but also by the universal practice of all mankind; who have now, for some thousands of years, all of them made it their business, in some degree or other, to discover truth, and to teach it to others; hoping, we must suppose (or they have spent their labour to little purpose) not only to increase their own happiness, but also to make others *know*, as the likeliest means to make them *do*, their duty.

How greatly must it surprise one then at last, to hear, that this is only a plausible mistake; which men have fallen into, as they have into most others, for want of proper consideration! That the direct contrary of all this is the truth; and that had men
been

been their own friends, they would have pursued a quite opposite plan!

I do not say this however, because I think, that either plausibility, or authority, ought to give a sanction to errors. — Let new lights and better information be followed, whenever they appear. — But surely of all the causes, which might incline men to imagine, that the world was impaired in happiness and virtue, the last one should ever have expected to see urged, would have been the allowed improvements of knowledge: as if the only way to make men happy, was to deprive them of their senses; and the only method of teaching them to do their duty, was not to let them know, in what it consisted!

Yet such is the wit of man, that even this great discovery has been lately made: which, were it true, would almost be evidence enough of itself to overthrow the arguments of its authors; so far superior is it to any thing our ancestors ever dreamt of! who, good men! weakly imagined, that these improvements were of some consequence to the world, and endeavoured therefore, as much as in them lay, to set them forward!

But

But so convinced have people been of the comparative badness of modern times, so determined do they seem to support the cause of former excellence; that those advantages, which they could not deny to later days, they have been cunning enough to convert into arguments against them.

— So that to vindicate the superiority of the present over former ages, we must not only shew, “that we have made many and great improvements, beyond what was known heretofore;” but (which seems a little hard!) “we must also now defend these very improvements themselves;” — must shew, that they have not made the times worse, rather than better; — must prove in short (which, who should ever have expected to be called upon to prove!) that the means of happiness and virtue are not the means of vice and misery.

It was to little purpose then, that in the preceding part of this essay I endeavoured to shew, “that knowledge and the arts of life are in a state of much greater perfection now, than ever they were before.” For to what end, may it well be asked, are we wiser, if we are not happier and better? How vain will our boasting be, if it should appear, that

that we have only increased our knowledge, to increase our sorrow! What will signify all our other improvements, granting them to be as great, as the warmest advocate for them can desire, if we have made no advances in that, which is of the greatest importance! If religion and virtue instead of producing daily better effects, lose ground, and cease to have that influence on our conduct which they not only ought, but formerly used to have! —

Had this supposition any good foundation, it must be owned our failing here would more than overbalance all our other acquisitions. We should be obliged with shame to confess, that we had purchased our improvements at too dear a rate. The loss of happiness and of virtue no gain can equal!

Let us proceed then in the next place to inquire, whether our advances in Science have been followed by like advances in Happiness and Virtue: or, if they have not, whether a failure in the latter instances can with any propriety be ascribed to a progress in the former, as a cause.

Happiness and Virtue are indeed, in the present circumstances of mankind, so intimately connected together; that the one is
ap-

apparently but the *means* of attaining the other, which may be called it's *end*. It may therefore be thought a kind of violence to separate them; and more especially so, if we put the end before the means. However, as they do in our ideas at least exist independently of each other; and as in the order of those ideas Man seems to present himself first in the character of a *sensible* Being, endued with certain feelings, and capable of receiving happiness and misery from them; before we view him in the light of a moral agent—I shall, for the sake of avoiding embarrassment, consider only at present, how far Happiness is likely to be affected by the improvements of life; and afterwards examine, what may be the fate of Virtue on the same account.

To some perhaps any attempt to prove, that we are happier, than our fathers were, may appear an odd undertaking: for the estimation of each man's happiness being seated in his own mind alone, it may seem to them, as if all we could do in this business would be to appeal to our own breast, and inquire there, whether we thought ourselves happier, than mankind were heretofore, or not.

There

There are however many objections against admitting this method of deciding the point. We are all of us apt to have either too good or too bad an opinion of ourselves and circumstances. Ask any one the question, and he will immediately answer, that his feelings in the suffering of misery are as acute, as any other's possibly can be; it is well if he does not add, more so: and he is as fully persuaded, that had he the means, he could also enjoy happiness as much, as any other. Yet if we judge either from the reason of the thing, or from observation on the different expressions of pain and pleasure, shewn by different men in similar circumstances, there cannot be any thing more evident, than that this is merely a piece of self-deception; however wisely it may be calculated, when under proper restrictions, to make us pleased and satisfied with ourselves.

We are as liable to be deceived in the estimate, which we make of our circumstances, by the short view of things, which we commonly take on such occasions. We see and feel the inconveniences of our own situation; we do not feel, and therefore but imperfectly perceive those, that attend our neighbours; how much less those, which

* B

might

might attend one, who lived a thousand years ago? our own happiness too at the same time grows cheap in our estimation by use and inattention; that, which we fancy is to be found in a different state, has novelty at least to recommend it: struck with that charm, we easily banish every intruding thought, that might pretend to lessen it's imagined worth.

Setting aside therefore so corrupt a determination, as that of our own partial minds would probably be in this case, let us appeal to a fairer and more equitable trial, — to the nature of things themselves; and enquire, not whether we are in fact happier, than mankind formerly were, which we can never know;* but whether we ought not to be so,

as

* And yet if we were even necessarily obliged to be guided, in forming our sentiments upon this article, merely by the accounts which people now and formerly have given us of their happiness; ancient times would not be such gainers in the comparison, as might at first sight be imagined. "Few and evil have the days of the years of my life been", we know was the complaint of one, who lived very far back in point of time, and who does not appear to have had any thing so very particular in his history, but what might easily be supposed to have happened to numbers in the same way of life; and therefore we may reasonably conclude, that the same was the complaint of many besides him even in that golden age;

as having more opportunities and a larger share of the means of happiness afforded us, than they could possibly have.

And in order to begin this inquiry from the most simple principles, we can; let us consider what the happiness of man must be, antecedent to society; — before virtue or its rules were ever thought of. However difficult it may be to conceive such a state, as ever actually existing; it is not at all so to imagine, what man's happiness must have been in it: it must have been exactly such, as the brutes enjoy, an unlimited indulgence of their appetites, as far as nature prompts or opportunity will serve; without either thought or care about any thing beyond mere existence; undisturbed by any sense of shame or dread of punishment; without all hopes of pleasure or fear of pain beyond the present moment.

The ingenious * *Rousseau*, whose abilities as a writer intitle him to the highest respect, what-

age; though the particular matter of them, for want of being registered, has never reached our ears. We know however in fact, that the same or similar has been the complaint of thousands in every age and every country, from that time to the present.

* In two treatises, one "Sur l'Origine et les Fondemens de l'Inégalité parmi les Hommes" and the other usually

whatever be thought of his opinions, is fond of calling this the true state of nature; and with a subtlety, which pleases the fancy at the

usually called his Prize Discourse, on this Question proposed by the Academy at Dijon, "Whether the Re-establishment of Arts and Sciences has contributed to purify our morals."

In the former describing man in a state of nature, he gives the following account of him "Son ame, que rien n'agite, se livre au seul sentiment de son existence actuelle sans aucune idée de l'avenir." "Les seuls biens qu'il connoisse dans l'univers sont nourriture, une femelle, et le repos." Speaking of the evils introduced by society, he says, "Voilà les funestes garands que la plupart de nos maux sont notre propre ouvrage, et que nous les aurions presque tous évités, en conservant la manière de vivre simple, uniforme, et solitaire, qui nous étoit prescrite par la nature." p. 22. In proof of which he afterwards adds, "La nature traite tous les animaux abandonnés à ses soins avec une prédilection, qui semble montrer combien elle est jaloux de ce droit." He then gives instances of the superior strength and beauty of wild animals, compared with the same made tame and domestic:—and observes, "Il en est ainsi de l'homme même, en devenant sociable et esclave, il devient foible, craintif, rampant; et sa manière de vivre molle et effeminée acheve d'enlever à la fois sa force et son courage." With only this disadvantage to man in the comparison, "qu'entre les conditions sauvage et domestique la différence d'homme à homme doit être plus grande encore, que celle de bête à bête; car l'animal et l'homme ayant été traités également par la nature, toutes les commodités que l'homme se donne de plus qu'aux animaux qu'il apprivoise, sont

the time that it misleads the judgement, attempts to shew, that the farther our improvements carry us from this original state, they do in proportion the greater violence to our natural constitution; and carry us the farther from a state of ease and happiness. — Ingenious deduction! by which it would appear, that an Idiot or a Changeling is happier, than the Scholar or Philosopher; — the wild Indian or Hottentot, a more enviable Being, than an Englishman or a Christian!

What serious † answer can be given to such

font autant de causes particulieres, qui le font dégénérer plus sensiblement.” p. 26.

N. B. Whenever hereafter the quotation from these treatises shall be in English, it will be taken from the Prize Discourse; when in French from the other.

† If Mr. *Rousseau* had not given abundant proofs that he was in earnest; one should have been apt to conclude, that he had written only in banter, with some such design, as an ingenious author amongst ourselves is supposed to have had in view, when he wrote his essay against artificial society; and sent it into the world as a posthumous work of a noble writer, who was much more celebrated for the strength of his imagination, than for soundness of judgement, or closeness of reasoning. — It was the drift of this spirited essay to expose artificial society, by setting before our view all the evils it had introduced, drawn in caricature, and concealing it's advantages: — a species of reasoning like what his would be, who should undertake to give us a complete idea of a horse

such a whimsical abuse of all rational inquiry? — the author of this philosophical paradox had nothing more to do, than to have shewn us the *reasonableness* and advantages of running mad; — to have pointed out to us the most easy and expeditious method of losing our senses; and his plan would have been complete! He is fond of quoting instances, and he might have found one at least full to his purpose, even on this head; the happy Madman, I mean, who declared to his friends, that they had ruined his ease by restoring him to his reason!

—— pol me occidistis, amici,

Non servastis, ait, cui sic extorta *voluptas*,

Et demptus per vim *mentis gratissimus Error!*

And certainly, if it be true, that the improvements of reason do indeed so much injury to our ease! the Being is happiest, that is without this dangerous principle! which is ever in-

viting

horse by reckoning up all the blemishes and distempers to which that noble animal is subject; and then telling us that a horse was a collection of splint, spavin, wind-gall, glanders, farcy, staggers, &c. adding withal a few significant notes of admiration!!! and concluding with a “caveat emptor,” a wholesome piece of advice, and a stricture or two upon the weakness of human reason, which could suffer any body to buy or ride such an animal, who, if he did not break your neck, must infallibly ruin your purse!

viting us to improve it; that is, ever solliciting us to make ourselves miserable. *

Let us drop then this boasted prerogative; by which we assert our right of dominion over other created Beings: — let us step from the seat of empire, that brings upon us so much care! — our subjects are happier, than we are! — the beasts of the forest; the most despised vermin; nay, the tree that betrays no symptom of thought, enjoys a far more enviable lot, than we do! Our boasted science tends but to perplex; we have found out the art indeed to multiply our wants, but not the means to gratify them; we have employed our wit only to contrive new fetters for the will; have been curious to devise rules to rob us of our ease; and have sacrificed

* One may easily agree with Mr. *Rousseau* in this — “Il seroit triste pour nous d’être forcés de convenir que cette faculté distinctive et presque illimitée, est la source de tous les malheurs de l’homme; que c’est elle, qui le tire, à force de tems, de cette condition originaire, dans laquelle il couleroit des jours tranquilles, et innocens; que c’est elle, qui faisant éclore avec les siècles ses lumières, et ses erreurs, ses vices, et ses vertus, le rend à la longue le tyran de lui même, et de la nature.” p. 34.

“J’ose presque assurer, que l’état de reflexion est un état contre nature, et que l’homme qui medite, est un animal depravé.” p. 22.

crificed the inestimable blessing of liberty, to the² imaginary good of government; government, which makes us dearly pay for every scanty pittance of that liberty, which it deigns to return us, who were once in full possession of it all!³ — Let us then at once break our chains; strip off these useless habiliments; return to our native woods; mix with our brother brutes; and feed again on mast and acorns!

It might be supposed, from the conclusion of the last paragraph, that I was representing the imaginary sentiments of some unfortunate wild beast, which had unhappily fallen into the toils of the hunter, and was now bewailing his captivity, restrained to the narrow limits of a den, and subject to the harsh controul of an angry keeper. The wood-bred Savage, † of near affinity to his fellow burghers, might possibly avow the same,

² “A’ acheter un repos en idée, au prix d’une félicité réelle.” p. 4.

³ “Une situation plus heureuse de n’avoir ni mal à craindre ni bien à espérer de personne, que s’être soumis à une dépendance universelle, et de s’obliger à tout recevoir de ceux, qui ne s’obligent à leur rien donner.” p. 65.

† “Il retourne chez ses Egaux”. Motto to Mr. Rousseau’s Frontispiece.

same, if dragged into society and taught it's manners: — "the sow, that was washed might return to her wallowing in the mire". It is impossible to say what effects the brutal part of our nature may have, when there is but a small degree of reason to withstand it, which is frequently strong enough to subdue even the most vigorous and enlightened understanding.

But it still remains a difficulty to think, how a *Citizen** and a Philosopher could so far forget the obligations he was under to society and it's institutions, as to embrace and defend such principles. Must he not mean, that God made us at first with only *instinct* † to direct us; or of such a circumscribed

* One too, who seems proud of the name, as it is that, by which he has chose to distinguish himself in the Title-page of his prize Discourse, written, as he informs us,

By a CITIZEN of Geneva.

— The country in the world, where according to Machiavel, "The people at this day live, either as to their ecclesiastical or military discipline, according to the model of the Ancients," of whom Mr. Rousseau every now and then, at least comparatively, seems to entertain a very high opinion.

† He tells us indeed in so many words, that "l'homme sauvage livré par la nature au seul instinct, &c." Yet this very instinct would probably have carried him much beyond what Mr. Rousseau calls

scribed capacity, as the beasts enjoy; free from this mischievous power of reason, this grand disturber of our peace; which has been merely the creature of our own depraved minds, an attribute of our own forming? For otherwise all his fine declamation against it will fall back upon the giver of this dangerous or useless faculty; and will dwindle into the common childish arraignment of God's wisdom for having made us thus.

What might have been man's situation, had he never tasted the fruit of that forbidden tree of Knowledge, might be difficult to determine; it is not easy perhaps to say, what is precisely meant by it. But of this one may be sure, that man might with as little absurdity be supposed to have been the author of his whole existence, as of his reason*. And we may be farther satisfied, that
if

calls a state of nature; might have taught him perhaps to herd with his fellow savages, and to build huts at least, as well as birds and beavers do. And in fact no people have ever yet been discovered so barbarous and ignorant, as to have made no improvements. All have their bows and arrows to kill their prey or their enemy; and a knife to carve and scalp with, when they have done.

* Yet Mr. Rousseau seems to have been of this opinion. "It is a great and glorious spectacle (says he, p. 3.) to see man, as it were rising out of No-

If the all-wise Author of our Being bestowed this gift upon us, he neither gave it to make us miserable, nor to *rust in us unus'd*. If we used it, however difficult it may be to trace out many of the first steps, that led to knowledge; by what happy discovery some principles were found out, and by what lucky connexions and combinations they were afterwards carried on to further perfection: however slow their advances, on this and many other accounts, may have been, it is plain, that things in course of time not only must have been, what matter of fact shews they are; but also that God must intend this.

To what purpose else were the many latent qualities and properties of things given? For what end were roots and plants indued with healing juices? Or for what use would the mine contain it's ore, and the earth it's hid

THING by his own proper efforts; dissipating the darkness, in which NATURE had involved him, by the *light of his reason*; elevating himself above his sphere; &c." — Though how *nature* can be said to have involved man in *darkness*, if at the same time she gave him the *light of reason* to direct him, must be left to Mr. Rousseau, I believe, to determine. It is to be wished too, that he had made it a little plainer to common capacities, how it is, that man can be looked upon as elevating himself above his sphere, if he is only using those powers, which nature indued him with.

hid treasures? — With what design could the mind be furnished with a power of acquiring, comparing, and reflecting upon it's ideas? But that those qualities and those properties were intended as fit and useful materials for the study and employment of these powers and these faculties? * What a striking harmony and beauty too does there appear in this! How can we be unhappy in a state to which our wise Creator has so peculiarly adapted us? How can we be said to be in a wrong pursuit, when we are only attempting to know, what seems thrown in our way on purpose to be known? How can we be miserable for endeavouring to acquaint ourselves with nature, and to find out fresh matter for admiring and adoring nature's God?

One might almost grow enthusiastic with such questions as these! — Was the starry vault of heaven, think ye, thrown around us, to raise in us no more regard, than what the beasts pay to it? Were we either to neglect

* “The mind has it's wants, (says Mr. Rousseau, p. 5.) as well as the body.” — If so, has it not at least as good a claim, as the other, to our care and attention in providing for it's wants, and supplying it's demands?

glect it's wondrous appearances *, or through ignorance and superstition tremble at their baneful influence, and sculk behind our bushes with a fear-taught reverence? Was the chief, best handy-work of God made capable of, and designed for, no higher office, than to eat, drink, and sleep? Must he give up the glorious hopes of immortality? Must he not only *die* like the beasts, that perish; but must he *live* like them also? Does he necessarily quit his happiness, whenever he indulges thought and reflexion? Are there no pleasures of the imagination? Will sober contemplation, and the discovery of truth, yield no joy? In what then must the happiness of purer beings consist? In what must our own consist, if we are to be happy, after we have put off this grosser body?—However to end at last this stretched-out string of interrogatories, one may surely assert, that the nearer we approach towards the perfection of our nature, the happier we must needs be. At least because men cannot be angels, it does not follow, that the next best situation for them is to be brutes: or because they cannot attain
pure

* Which seems to be Mr. Rousseau's opinion. Speaking of his favorite savage, he says, "le spectacle de la nature lui devient indifférent," p. 38.

pure happiness, that therefore they should despise and quarrel with that mixt degree of it, which is allowed them. They who advance such principles as these, might as well say at once, that there was no such thing as happiness designed for man. For it is not the exercise of the mind alone, that is attended with uneasiness: they who maintain, that man's chief good consists in the exercise of his body, and the indulgence of his appetites, will never be able to shew, that this will meet with no interruptions, nor ever be attended with pain. And he who can bring himself seriously to believe, that *Thinking* is contrary to nature and man's true happiness, because uneasy thoughts may arise; might as well fancy, that *Eating* was contrary to nature, and abstain from all food, because some sorts of it were nauseous, and others contained poison in them.

It may easily be seen and allowed, that in the very brightest parts of our happiness there is a large share of shade intermixt; which, viewed through the false medium of a gloomy apprehension*, may swell into a
size

* Tell the morose and sullen traveller, whose malign eye is always shut against the fair side of things,
and

size far beyond it's true proportion. It must be farther owned, that the very best of our improvements bring with them sufficient marks of imperfection to humble us into a sense of our duty and dependence — to teach us, that we are to look for perfect happiness, not from our own weak powers, nor on this frail earth, but from his bounty, who as an earnest of what he can and will do for us, has given us the happiness we enjoy, not complete indeed, but far superior to the misery, that abates it, and capable of increase, we find, from our own endeavours.

Were it otherwise, this life, instead of being

and loves to dwell only on their ugliest appearances, how chearful and pleasant it is to have an agreeable companion on the road! he will perhaps mutter in return, that the chief use he sees in the best company, is only to cover you with dirt in bad weather, and with dust in good. But must we therefore by such a sarcastic representation of things be induced to quit our friend; with whom we know how to be happy; who is continually pointing out to us new matter of amusement, which without him we might have overlooked; and who by lending an attentive ear to our discoveries, doubles the pleasure we have in making them? Let the sullen wretch ride on, despising and despised by all, out of humor with every little untoward circumstance, and pleased with none; whilst we can pick out matter for amusement and improvement even from our very distresses and inconveniences.

ing a state of happiness or probation, would be a scene of misery and punishment; and that the worst, which imagination can well form; as we should be the necessary authors of our own sufferings. We should not only reason to no purpose; — not only study ourselves into doubts and perplexities (as the poet describes the damned to do) but after having used our best endeavours to discover fresh means of happiness, we should have the cruel mortification to find, that we had only employed our ingenuity to devise new materials for our misery. Surely it can never be thought, that this could be the order and constitution of things, settled and appointed by a wise and benevolent Being. Let those consider then, who make it their business to vilify and decry human happiness, what an injury they do to God's moral attributes and perfections!

All that can be fairly inferred from the most unfavourable appearances, is, that the means of happiness are not necessarily such; -- that we may and frequently do pervert them in such a manner, as to make them become our greatest misfortunes. But who would argue from thence, that they had better never been given us? The blessing of
health

health is as frequently misapplied, as any we enjoy: would it have been better then for Providence to have consigned us over to perpetual sickness? It may be an alleviation of our sorrow, when we are thrown into such circumstances, to consider, that we are at least by this means happily free from many temptations, which others are liable to: but it will not follow, either that health is an evil, which injures our happiness; or, that sickness is a blessing, which promotes it: and no one will ever fancy, that it can be so, who thinks with proper gratitude on the favors, which heaven bestows; — or indeed who thinks at all.

CHAP. III.

The Happiness of social and savage Life compared.

KEEPING then in mind the above allowances, let us now take a nearer view of social and savage life; and we shall soon discern, on which side the preference lies.

We have already seen, in what the happiness of a savage must consist *. With so few avenues open to pleasure, it is reasonable to allow, that a number will by the same means be shut against uneasiness. To do him then the greatest justice we can in the comparison, let us suppose him past the helpless state of childhood; and that he is not yet arrived at second childhood, feeble old age; that he is little subject to sickness, and as little sensible of pain. Yet with all these advantageous circumstances, how great might his sufferings be, should an accidental lameness unfit him for the chase; or an inclement season destroy his fruits? And what a dreadful picture might be drawn of him, should he by chance dislocate a joint, or break a limb? How must the

* Page 27. "Les seul biens, qu'il connoisse." &c.

the feeling heart shudder to view him, laid on the cold earth, where his misfortune first happened; with no skilful hand to minister assistance; no friendly tongue to comfort him; subject to be torn in pieces by the next wild beast, that discovered him, the least shocking circumstance perhaps in his situation; without all hopes but in time or death; and if not sure to die of his wound, yet the almost certain victim of hunger and of thirst!

To make however the greatest possible concession, let it be supposed, that the man, who is miserable in society, is still more wretched, than we have even described this unhappy savage to be: yet what would follow from hence? A fallen angel may suffer still more, than the most wretched of mortals; as misery, exclusive of it's positive evil, is probably always proportionable to the happiness, which we ourselves before enjoyed, or which we see others in possession of at present; but this surely would not be looked upon as any kind of proof, that a good angel was not happier, than we are. How would the argument shock us, that should dissuade us from attempting to gain the happiness of heaven, because if we failed in our

C 2

attempt,

attempt, we should be more miserable, than if we had never made it!

Without entering then into nice disquisitions about it's origin, whether it was the child of reason, or of chance; or from whatever cause it sprung; to take it as it is in the world, the true account of what society has done for us, is probably this. — It has introduced some evils into life, which otherwise would have had no existence, but then it has also been the happy means of many great advantages and comforts, of which without it we had been entirely destitute. And even for those ills, which necessarily attend it, it has provided, in most cases, correspondent remedies. Do we labor under pain and sickness? The Physician is at hand to give us ease. Are we ready to faint under the heavy burden of misfortunes? The voice of Religion will speak comfort to our souls. But it unluckily happens, that we are perverse enough to dwell upon the ills of life, and will not reflect upon it's blessings; half of which, such as security and defence against the inclemency of seasons, and the invasion of hunger by a constant and regular supply of food and cloathing, we scarce ever think of!

Taking

Taking a fair account of the evil and the good of it together, we may safely grant the worst, that can be said against society. Let it be urged, that it has given birth to many crimes and vices. — We can justly reply, that it has also been the kind parent of every virtue. Be it allowed, that the consciousness of guilt and dread of shame may bring on such terrors to the mind, as they who know not, what shame or transgression is, are free from. — Will not the reflexion on virtuous deeds, the thoughts of having done our duty, the heart-felt joy of having been the means of happiness to others, and the chearful voice of praise, declaring our worth, yield pleasures, that will more than equal all that uneasiness? Suppose there is no room in what they so falsely call a state of nature for dishonesty, falsehood, malice, and ingratitude. — Would not such a state exclude also all those tender ties and tenderer offices of love and friendship? Those endearing relations of husband, father, son and brother; that raise such feeling sympathies, kindle such a glow of affection, and give such a polish and softness to humanity? The man alone, who is insensible of these, if he deserves that name, who is so, can seek for

happiness in woods and solitude! He alone, who by his crimes and vices has rendered mankind his enemies; who lives in daily fear of paying his life a forfeit to the community, whose laws and peace he has violated; can envy the solitary savage, who after his morning chace is over, and he has dined upon his prey, now fears, lest he in turn should become a prey himself; and hiding himself in his thick cover, scarce enjoys a wakeful kind of slumber*, for listening to the noise of some approaching danger!

* Seul, oisif, et toujours voisin du danger, l'homme sauvage doit aimer à dormir, et avoir le sommeil léger comme les animaux, qui pensant peu, dorment, pour ainsi dire, tout le temps, qu'ils ne pensent point. p.28.

CHAP. IV.

Of Improvements in Civil Life.

SOME however may think, though they do not carry the hypothesis so far as to prefer absolute barbarism to society, that yet there is nevertheless a certain honest plainness in the early manners and institutions of civil life, which highly recommends them; and that, in leaving this original simplicity, men left the fairest chance they ever had for happiness.

But remove that secret charm, which lies hid in the word *First*, and which always runs away with our admiration; and it will soon be seen, what little foundation there is for such a supposition.

There is indeed a necessity in unsettled states for men to adhere strictly to certain principles, and to practise certain duties without the obligation of Laws, which may not yet be formed: and this no doubt at first sight gives them a specious appearance of disinterested benevolence. The veriest reprobates upon earth, in a case of common danger, may do such things for the public good, as in other circumstances they would never have thought of: — and with those

who look no farther, they may by this means get the character of great worth and honesty. — But what should we think of his reasoning, who should conclude, because he saw these men acting in such a situation better, than he expected they would, that therefore they were the best of all mankind? And who in his senses, if he could avoid it, would choose to be in a state of danger, rather than of security, merely because he might experience some acts of kindness from those about him in the former case, which in the latter he would not want?

How weakly too must they reason, who can think, that the less perfect any thing is, the more likely it is to answer it's end? Yet thus *they* must reason, if they reason at all, *who* can fancy, that men in the beginning of society were happier, than they are now: or they must say, that the first essays towards civil Government, Agriculture, and Architecture, reached at once to the highest possible degree of perfection. — Which of the two would be the least absurd proposition?

The first * Government, that was formed, might be much better, than Anarchy: but

* Mr. *Rousseau*, who seems to be exceedingly out of humour with government says, p. 5th. "Necessity

but in such a government how many cases must there necessarily be, intirely unprovided for; in which the situation of mankind would be little bettered? Time and attention to the several exigencies, as they arose, could alone give any thing like a finishing hand to these rude beginnings.

The first crop of corn, which the cultivated ground yielded, would, no doubt, be a sity at first raised thrones, but Arts and Sciences confirmed them? Now what necessity could it be, which at first raised thrones? One is much at a loss to guess; unless it were a necessity, arising from the vices of mankind, which could no other way be restrained within proper bounds, than by the strong chains of government. But if it was such a necessity, it will appear, unluckily enough for Mr. *Rousseau's* argument, that there were vices and unhappiness too in the world, before Arts and Sciences introduced them: why else should such a remedy be wanting? That Arts and Sciences have indeed confirmed thrones, one may intirely agree with Mr. *Rousseau*, though not altogether in his sense of the words. How Necessity does it's business, we are all well aware — in a very rough and uncouth manner. The governments it introduced, were such, we may suppose, as served, in some degree, to repress injuries; to keep savages in order: but it is owing to Arts and Sciences, that they are become such at length, as rational creatures may with pleasure submit to, without regretting the loss of that original liberty, which, whatever Mr. *Rousseau* may say in praise of it, could never be designed for man to continue in: if it was, nature did her work most bunglingly, that it should be necessary so soon to mend it,

a very valuable accession to the comforts and conveniences of life: but how can we suppose, that either the ends of the husbandman, or of the community were so well answered then; as when afterwards proper manures and an experienced management of the earth, had made *the vallies stand so thick with corn*, that, in the language of the Psalmist, “they should laugh and sing”?

The first house or hut, that was built, might be a more convenient shelter from the weather, than the covert or the cave: Yet who can imagine, that all the conveniences of a house would immediately be discovered on the first trial?

We might argue thus, if mere necessity or use alone were the standards to measure perfection by in these instances; which however is by no means the case. Some dignity and ornament ought to accrue to human life from them, or they will but poorly answer their end —

“O, reason not the need,” (says the most philosophical of all poets) —

“Our basest beggars

Are in the poorest thing superfluous;

Allow not nature more, than nature needs,

Man's life is cheap as beast's.” —

A Reasoner on Mr. *Rousseau's* principles might say, that nature had provided for us such a temperament of body, and such a skin to cover it, as would be sufficient to bear all the changes and inclemencies of different seasons and climates. On that supposition, the man, who first cloathed himself in the shaggy spoils of the prey he had killed, was guilty of an unpardonable breach of Nature's laws. However had mankind stopt there; and wore their covering only in that original unmanufactured state; they would have differed so little from those animals, whose dress they had usurped; that it would have been extremely difficult to ascertain their superiority by any other proof, than that, which could shew they were endued with greater strength, cunning, or swiftness.

If our natural constitution too were such, as was best suited to digest victuals, reeking from the slaughter; the simple cookery of boiling, or roasting, would not only be a faulty piece of luxury; but a real injury to our health. Let men however only be cloathed in skins, and feed on their raw prey, mast or acorns; what a poor preeminence would they have to boast of? It cannot surely be imagined, either that Beings, who would soon experience within them a principle,
push-

pushing them on to better things, and pointing out the way to higher attainments, could possibly be restrained within such narrow and unworthy bounds; or that Nature could design, they should. They, who think she could intend this, must charge her with the glaring inconsistency of furnishing us with principles, which must necessarily soon defeat the end, she had in view.

But Nature cannot properly be looked upon, as the Architect of our happiness: — she only supplies us with the materials and means, which it is the business of Art to use and apply: and the degree of perfection in this case must depend upon the degree of skill in those who make use of these means.*

The representation, which *Locke* gives us of the human mind, as it first comes from Nature's hands; when he compares it to a blank sheet, unstained by any, but capable of receiving all sorts of impressions; is, in some measure, a true representation of the great Volume of Nature; which is all but one universal Blank; till Art has stamped
it's

* “*Faber quisque fortunæ suæ*,” is perhaps a truer proposition, if we construe *fortune*, *happiness*, than if we take it in any other sense. We are indebted to Nature for bringing us into the world in certain circumstances, and for giving us certain faculties; but the rest must be all our own doing.

it's characters upon it. And however more pleasing to the eye this original purity and whiteness may appear; just as the sheet did which I am at this instant blotting; yet this can never be argument enough to persuade us, that it was made on purpose always to continue so. We have all the reason in the world to conclude the direct contrary: and however Nature's designs may be thwarted or perverted in particular instances, we ought surely to entertain a more respectable opinion of her councils and foresight, than to suppose this ever could happen in the general course of things.

As some advances then must be made, — the order, which both reason and matter of fact would point out to us for the natural progress of human affairs, might perhaps be justly exhibited to our view by a scale, marked at proper intervals, with the following gradations — Necessity — Convenience — Ornament — Elegance — Propriety.

The first object of man's attention must necessarily be his most pressing wants. Viewing him however in the light, in which he is commonly considered, merely as an animal of certain determinate abilities, these would be very few; and nature has furnished an

an ample, and an easily procurable provision for them. After the natural appetites of hunger, thirst, and what would lead him to continue his species, were satisfied, a secure repose would be almost all a savage life would need. If he farther required some shelter from the storm, or the cold; the covert, or the cave would afford it to him, as readily as to his brother brutes. But taking man for what he really is, a Being made and designed for continual improvement; the above account would but ill express his natural wants: so that this first, and indeed all the other divisions, must be enlarged, as we advance in perfection. The circle, which would include all the Necessities, Conveniences, &c. of a Negro, or a North-American, would fall far short of comprehending * those of an Englishman, or an European.

After we have learnt in some sort to satisfy our wants, our next consideration will naturally

* I do not mean however to make these quite so many as my ingenious friend, the author of THE LADIES NECESSARIES FOR THE YEAR 1760, has done: — who, (I perceive from a waste sheet of his works, which brought me the paper on which I write from the Stationer's) has reckoned up under the article of *Necessaries for Lady-day Quarter*, no less than fifty different trades, many of which deal in no less, than a hundred and fifty different Articles.

rally be, how to do this for the future with the most convenience: and being masters of this also, we shall next bestow our attention on setting off these conveniences with some degree of ornament. The first essays towards which, must necessarily be clumsy and awkward; and from experience we might perhaps be justified in adding, profuse in quantity and in number. It will be the business of taste, which will succeed next in order, to give some measure, form, and elegance to these rude ornaments.*

It

* As Dress and Architecture are what furnish the leading ideas in such considerations, as the present; it may not be amiss perhaps to sketch out and exemplify, by their means, the order above laid down. We may take it for granted I think, that it was Necessity, which first suggested the thought of a covering to defend us from the cold, — It was Convenience however most certainly, which formed this covering into a particular shape, and furnished it with pockets and some other appendages. After this succeeded the spirit of Ornament, and added sleeves and folds; and laying hold of what convenience had devised, spread buttons without end over every part of our cloaths, for nothing but mere show; as may be seen at large in the dresses of our Ancestors. It has been the endeavour of Taste, however slow it's success, to give some shape and elegance to these sleeves and folds: and it would be perhaps the business of Propriety to destroy intirely both the one and the other; as it has done, if it will not hurt the beautiful
part

It is one thing however to reduce the former absurdity and extravagance of ornament to some reasonable measure, and some tolerable

part of our species to quote the instance, with hoops and caps; which art had been long in vain attempting to give some grace and beauty to. But least dwelling longer on such subjects as these should be looked upon as letting down the dignity of philosophy; let us pass on to the nobler instance of Architecture.

Man would scarce have got within his hut, secure from the wind and storm, and satisfied himself a little with the convenience of it; before he would be attempting to ornament it both within and without. And indeed it would be no very difficult matter to trace most of the ornaments in Architecture up to very simple beginnings. Who can doubt, for example, that the projecting ends of spars, tied to the uprights by little brackets, gave the first idea of a cornice and it's modillions? As little can it be doubted, that the pent-house at the door, made to defend the entering guest from the dropping of the eaves, and supported by it's two posts or props, gave rise to the sumptuous pediment; the chapters of whose pillars at first were nothing more, than the simple stumps of branches, imperfectly lopt off, interspersed with some smaller twigs and leaves; though since set off with all the variety of five different Orders. But I shall be suspected here of imitating the ingenious solution, which a great writer has given us of the Gothic roof. Besides the dignity and merit of Grecian Architecture is so thoroughly established, that any attempt to lessen it, would only fall back on the head of him, who should set about it. Turn we our eyes then to some of the early specimens of Building amongst

able degree of elegance; and another to devise something new, which may be more suitable, and answer the end better. The attempt-

amongst ourselves; What a number of little conveniences shall we discover? What a profusion of ornaments in the next place presents itself to our view? — Scarce a stone, or piece of wood, in the whole fabric, that does not carry on it evident marks of the ingenuity of the Graver's tool, either representing, in some curious device, the arms of the owner, or the shape of some wolf, griffin, or other monster, drawn in all the most frightful distortions of hideous ugliness! Whilst to shew the refined taste, which then prevailed, even the water on the roof is conveyed off by spouts passing through the figure of a human face; which, being ingeniously supported by two hands, frequently presents such an appearance, as the reader would hardly thank me for conveying more fully to his imagination. And at the same time to characterize their want of feeling, the great Door at the entrance is made to be pulled to and fro' by a ring, drawn through the jaw, and held by the teeth, of something, that is intended to represent the head of an animal!

It was in vain for taste to endeavour at any refinement of such horrid emblems of barbarity, as these: — farther improvement has therefore with great propriety intirely suppressed them.

If it was not likely to carry one too far, it would perhaps be no very difficult undertaking, nor altogether foreign to the present inquiry, to point out a distant kind of resemblance at least between the process above laid down, and that which has taken place in matters of much higher consequence; such as, Ethics, Politics, Religion, &c. But at present I will

attempting to do this, with it's successive progress, constitutes the last division in the scale, which I have called Propriety. Many subdivisions

leave it to the reader to carry on the comparison in these instances, by the help of his own fancy and observation. And in the mean time will take the opportunity of assigning some of those causes, that seem to have prevented Architecture from making that progress amongst the Moderns, especially amongst us of this kingdom; which otherwise, if we formed our judgement only upon the degree of perfection to which other arts are brought, might reasonably have been expected.

In the first place then, even our improvements in other instances, have greatly contributed (which is seldom the case) to hinder our advances in this. By our knowing a little more of Hydrostatics, than was formerly known, we have learnt, that there is no need to build vast aqueducts at immense expence, cross vallies of a large extent; which afforded such a continual fund of employment to the architects of former ages.

As we are become also more civilized and humane, we should have now no relish for the barbarous exhibitions of the Amphitheatre; and therefore have no more occasion for that species of building: by which means another main source of ancient architecture is intirely stopt up.

We have in some degree quitted the towering flights of Heroes, chalked out by fiction and epic poetry; and have descended into the humbler path of sober men and rational creatures: Temples, Obelisks, and Triumphal Arches are therefore now no longer raised to flatter a Conqueror's, or rather a Murderer's vanity, and to encourage others to kill

visions however might be added; such as Pleasure, Refinement, &c. — But these, to avoid minuteness, I have purposely omitted.

By as many, and do as much mischief, as he had done.

By our being happily freed from the evils of civil war, and by the whole Island's being united into one Kingdom, we are not now under the bitter necessity of erecting Walls, Fortresses, and Castles, for places of defence, and to maintain a barrier: things, which afford a much more pleasing prospect, when beheld in ruins! — Hail, ye ancient venerable battlements! How well does that ivy covering become you! whilst your only inhabitants the hooting owl, and chattering daw, now securely wing their way through those openings, from whence the marksman took his aim, and sent the feathered arrow on it's hostile errand! Long may ye rear your antique heads, as monuments of former misery, the better to remind us of that happiness, which even whilst we are enjoying we are too apt to forget!

Lastly, to the piety of our good Ancestors, or perhaps in some instances to their consciences, wrought upon by the terrors of guilt, and managed by the holy zeal of their Confessors, we are indebted for an ample supply of Churches and public Edifices of that sort.

So that all the employment of the modern Architect is almost necessarily confined to private houses, and now and then a bridge. — Had they the same subjects to exercise their skill upon, which their predecessors had, what a number of improvements upon the dry rules and examples of Vitruvius and Palladio, might not men of genius in this science make by the help of some late philosophical explanations of what constitutes the true nature of the *Sublime* and *Beautiful*!

By laying down the above gradations in a certain order, I would not be understood to mean, that the progress of human affairs through them has been uniform and regular: on the contrary, it is certain, that they have sometimes gone back a little; but then like those, who would overleap some opposing difficulty, they seem only to have made a voluntary retreat, in order to advance again with the greater spring.

Neither do I mean, by stopping at *Propriety*, to limit human improvements within these bounds. Though perhaps most people will think, if I had, there would still have been employment enough left to exercise the wits of succeeding generations for many ages, before they had completed all that is included even within these limits.

What I intended was only to assign such terms, as might take in all, that had hitherto been done. — There may be degrees of *Propriety*, and even of *Perfection*, which may afford room enough for an endless progression both in Knowledge and in Happiness.

It
full! And what a noble opportunity for shewing these improvements would not the building of a ROYAL PALACE afford, if it was made suitable either to the riches and importance of the British Crown, or to the worth and greatness of Him, who wears it!

It might be difficult too to assign precisely the point, at which we are arrived in this progression; from many appearances however both within doors and without; in the closet, and in the field; in the drawing-room, and in the garden; I think one might conclude, that we are somewhere upon the borders of the last division.*

But it was not for such speculations, that I produced this imaginary scale; it was only to ask, with the greater precision, at which of these divisions mankind should have stopt, in order to have gained the greatest share of happiness? Which perhaps, at last, will be best determined by an instance.

A Commonwealth has been frequently compared to a ship. Let us hold this comparison up, and look at it a little. The man, who either through necessity or choice, ventured

* What Loads of wood, and how awkwardly put together, went to the making up the furniture of our Ancestors apartments? And what a miserable grid-iron taste was exhibited in the parallel beds and walks of their Pleasure Gardens, ornamented at every corner with some poor unfortunate Evergreen, tortured into the most unnatural and Gothic forms, that the rude and barbarous imagination of a clumsy hedge-cutting Gardener could devise? — We have certainly in these instances, made large advances of late towards some degree of *Propriety*.

tured himself upon a rude raft, or hollowed trunk; and in it sailed, or swam across the stream, too deep for fording; made certainly the first attempt towards the art of Navigation. Did he, who gave the shape of a boat, and added oars to this rude raft, make it worse? — Did he, who farther secured it by the addition of a deck, anchor, cables, mast, sails, rudder, &c. forming thereby a regular ship, render the original discovery still less useful? — And did he, who lastly, by the invention of the compass, completed the art of navigating this vessel, give the finishing hand towards spoiling it for use? — Or is not the direct contrary of all this true? — The other side of the comparison is so obvious, that it is needless to go through the particulars of it: but we may safely conclude, that the same sort of process, which at length completed the art of navigation, must have a similar effect in rendering human Governments, and every thing that belongs to them, more perfect, and more likely to answer the ends, for which they were designed; and which could seemingly be no other than human happiness.*

If

* To carry on however the above allusion a little farther, we may observe, that the ship of state being made,

If there be some, who will be convinced of this by nothing but experience; let them follow Norden up the Nile, from Alexandria to the cataracts, and see how society improves, the farther they go from a state of civilization towards barbarism! How much more happy will they find it to live in the parts about Derri, than at Alexandria, or Grand Cairo! And yet how very imperfect is the most improved state in Egypt, when compared to European policy?

made, like it's archetype, of perishable materials, however artfully compacted, must like it also be liable in time to decay: It will require therefore frequently to be careened and refitted; — nay, sometimes to be almost intirely rebuilt, with only a few of the original principles preserved just like the head or stern-post to intitle it to it's old name. What is worse, when this ship is in it's best trim, factions may arise on board, and she may be overset and lost by imprudent management. — Or, if not so, there is many a latent rock unknown to the most able pilot: — storms too and sudden tempests may arise, enough to baffle all the strength and art of the hardiest seaman. — All therefore, which can be safely concluded, is, that the more skilfully this vessel is constructed, and the better the mariners are on board, the greater chance she has, as the phrase is, to weather it out.

C H A P. V.

Of the Patriarchal, Grecian, and Roman Governments.

BUT how plausible soever, it may seem in theory, or from some recent examples, "that the wiser men grow, the better governments they will have;" there are I make no doubt, many people in the world, who will fancy notwithstanding, that our best modern institutions fall far short of those, which obtained in Greece or Rome; and farther still of those, which rendered the lives of the early Patriarchs as much happier, as they were longer, than our's,

Perhaps, if history had described any more ancient Governments than these, they would have sent us still farther back in search of happiness and perfection. But though we are not particularly informed, under what kinds of Government Men lived before the Flood; yet we are fully assured by the most authentic records, "that the whole earth was filled with violence": which, as it is a circumstance, that makes but little in favour of their perfection, so does it convey to the mind but a poor idea of the happiness then subsisting in the world!

Before.

Before we examine however any farther into the merits of this matter, or endeavour to find out what foundation there may be in fact for such suppositions; it may not be amiss to settle in the first place some general and primary principles, which must essentially enter into our idea of all Government, whenever we consider it as a Good, and by a fitness to promote which in a greater or less degree, the several different species of it, whatever their particular constitution may be, will be more or less perfect, and productive of happiness. — Perhaps it will be allowed, that the three following are principles of this sort — Security — Liberty — and the means of a comfortable Subsistence.

If man were placed in Mr. *Rousseau's* ideal state of nature, he would have a right to whatever he wanted, wherever he could find it; and he would also be at liberty to rove, wherever he pleased. The precarious manner however in which he must subsist, and the continual dangers, to which he would be exposed, would render his situation far from desirable. Whatever he was in pursuit of, or whatever he had acquired, he might be liable the next moment to be driven from, or deprived of, by one of his own species, either more swift or more strong, than

than he was. If then in some of his comfortless ramblings he should accidentally meet with one of these, who far from attempting to kill him, or to take from him the coarse fare he was eating, should somehow or other make him understand, that he would take him under his protection; and be bound to defend him, and every thing he acquired, against all others; if he would only in return do some little services for him, which he might easily perform; — that he might be almost sure of a constant supply of food with him; — and that he should be intirely at his liberty to leave him whenever he should think himself severely treated. — Could he on any due reflection refuse to embrace so promising an offer?

Encrease the numbers concerned in such a contract, and superadd to the conditions already mentioned a right in the ruler to punish offences; and we shall have the idea of a Government, in which a considerable advantage is stipulated for on the side of the governed, and only some little honor, ease, or authority on the part of the governor. It will be of small importance in this case, whether the ruling powers be vested in One, in a Few, or in Many.

But

But upon trial if the subject finds, that his pretended patron is unable or unwilling to protect him; by which means he suffers continual insults and injuries; and lives in as much fear, as he did before; — that so far from meeting with a ready and constant supply of necessaries, he sees himself daily subject, by the ill management of his master, to the dreadful calamity of famine, besides being involved in many other disagreeable circumstances. — Who would say, if such were to be the consequence, that he had parted with his liberty to any good purpose?

I would not have it imagined from any thing I have here said, that I was pretending to account for the origin of government: all I intended was merely to explain what I meant by the three principles above-mentioned; and which in fewer words is only this, that let the origin of Government be what it will, if the end be not in some degree a real improvement in the circumstances of those, who live under it, it cannot be fit for rational creatures to submit to: — and that one species of it will always be exactly so much better, than another, in proportion as it answers this end more effectually.

If any one thinks it would be more natural, in the instance above supposed, for

the stronger savage to seize the weaker, and without any conditions on his part to make him his slave; and can fancy also, that it would be easy for him to keep him in that state of subjection; he has my free leave to substitute this supposition instead of the other, with only this clause annexed; that if mankind were either originally born, or soon after made slaves, they would at least by this time have found out the art of making their chains sit the easier, and of rendering their confinement less disagreeable.

These things being thus premised, let us now take a short survey of the three different Governments above-mentioned as far as human welfare is concerned in them. And as the Patriarchs stand first in point of time, let us begin with them, and see what pretensions they can fairly make to this contested superiority.

We shall be better able to prosecute this inquiry, as we have some specimens of nearly the same form of government with their's, still subsisting in the world; and, which may be reckoned rather particular, in nearly the same countries: the present clans or hords of Tartars, flying camps of Arabs, &c. affording us a tolerably just idea of those old moving

moving Communities, which had their habitation in tents, pitched occasionally, where they could find water and pasturage for their cattle. And indeed this of Clans or Hords, though with some difference one from another, seems to have been the original state of society amongst all nations: whose chief employment we shall find, wherever we hear of them, has uniformly been, rather to make depredations upon their neighbour's property, than to prevent any occasion for this by exerting their own industry to provide enough for their wants at home. In which mixt species of war and robbery the nimblest hunter would naturally become a character of the first consequence*. And the greater number of these characters there was in such a confederacy, the better chance would they have for security and subsistence.

As to Liberty they might either enjoy it or not, just as it happened. The Arabs,

* Accordingly we find this account given of Nimrod, (the first founder of a kingdom) when "he began to be a mighty one in the earth," — that "he was a mighty *Hunter*." If it was not for a peculiar dignity in the sacred writings, this relation would not appear unlike what is said of some of our present North American Chiefs. "Apud quos (as Corn. Nep. says it was among the Persians) *fortiter Venari summa laus est*."

Montesquieu observes, have it: the Tartars not. But in either case it is easy to see, that society in such a state is but one small remove from the situation of the Savage above described; — it is but a kind of agreement to hunt in troops, and to defend their prey. The inconveniences attending such a state lie so open to every one's imagination, that it might seem impertinent to make any reference to history for a farther account of them.

If however any one should entertain a doubt that such a description would be unfair, when applied to the Patriarchs; he need only look into the writings of Moses to be thoroughly satisfied, that such an application would be far from doing them any injustice. The frequent *strivings* (which is but a softer term for the fightings) of one set of Herdsmen with another, which we read of there; — their being obliged to watch their flocks all night; — the difficulty they were under of getting provision for their cattle, and especially water in a country, which is almost literally what the Psalmist calls “a barren and dry land, where no water is;” — and the many famines, which in consequence of this and their having no settled or secure tillage, they endured; are surely all together
such

such circumstances, as will afford arguments enough to prove, that this manner of living is but poorly calculated to answer the end either of security or subsistence.

Had it not been indeed for the peculiar guidance of Providence, what condition of existence could have been worse, than that of the Patriarchs, “at what time they wandered about from one country to another; from one kingdom to another people?” whose precarious happiness was continually liable to be interrupted not only from their own imperfect circumstances, but also from the perpetual wars and feuds, which were subsisting between those nations, in or near whose territories they had their dwelling!

In Greece however, it must be owned, society put on a much more promising appearance. Men had here regular cities, and fixt habitations to dwell in. Their early philosophers too, or lawgivers, wisely taught them the use and advantages of Agriculture: which, if properly attended to, would have produced a happy alteration indeed in their circumstances! but it was an art of rather too dull and laborious a kind to be heartily esteemed by those, who had been used to a less confined and more idle method of subsisting.

Hunters

Hunters and Warriors are characters but ill suited, and commonly too proud, to submit to the drudgery of the plough. Accordingly we find, it was left here almost intirely to the management of their slaves, or those they had conquered, and brought into a state of dependence: whilst a taste for war and military exercises so intirely prevailed amongst the masters, that had it not been, Montefquieu observes, for a peculiar attention at the same time to music (which was therefore always regarded in their laws as an article of main importance) they would in all probability have deserved the title of *Barbarians*, as much as any of those, on whom they so freely bestowed that degrading appellation.

What mischievous effects this martial spirit and love for arms must have had in such a situation as Greece was in, amongst a number of little petty sovereignties, crouded together in a very narrow compass, is easy to be imagined. We may assist the imagination however, or bring the picture at least more home to ourselves, if we only fancy the several different corporate towns in our own Kingdom, with certain portions of land lying round them, to become so many separate states, the Mayor, Common-Council, and Alder-

Aldermen *, being both Legislators and Leaders of Armies; invested each with supreme power, a right of making war, and inroads into each other's territories, for injuries received, instead of appealing to any common head or body of Laws; some of them by principle encouraging theft and frauds, and none of them deeply impressed with steady notions of justice †; if we only imagine, I say, such a state of things to take place, the same fierce thirst for arms still prevailing; and then reflect for a moment on the peace and harmony likely to attend it; we shall have no very imperfect idea of that happiness,

* It may be thought by some perhaps, that these peaceful Magistrates are but poor representatives of the warlike *Archons*, *Ephori*, &c. of the Grecian states; — but yet it is the common idea which translators give us of these great Officers. Thus Sir Walter Raleigh, “*Erixias* was the last Archon of the *decennial* Governors at Athens, which form was then changed into *annual* Magistrates, *Mayors*, or *Burgomasters*, of which *Theseus* was the first.”

† Whoever considers how perpetually and shamefully almost every treaty was broke amongst them, and that on all sides, will not think that this is said without foundation. It is rather particular too, what *Corn. Nepos* tells us of *Aristides*, “*ut unus post hominum memoriam, quod quidem nos audivimus cognominie JUSTUS sit appellatus.*” And it was

ness, which blessed the members of the § Gre-
 eian commonwealth. And in fact to this
 seems
 was a pleasant reason enough, which was given by
 one, why he voted for his banishment, "that it
 was true indeed he knew nothing at all of Aristides,
 but that he did not like his affectation of being
 called Just."

§ If Homer wrote his Iliad, as it is said he did,
 with the political view of uniting these jarring and
 discordant bodies; and only veiled, under the cover-
 ing of what happened at the siege of Troy, those
 quarrels and dissensions, with their attendant evils,
 which he saw then actually subsisting before his eyes;
 what an unfavourable picture of his country does he
 present to our view? There is no occasion however
 to appeal to poetry for a proof of this: their hi-
 story proves the same in so many instances, that it is
 endless to quote them. It is indeed little else, from
 beginning to end, but one continued collection of in-
 surrections and ostracism, war and outrage, plagues
 and famines, oracles and prodigies. Poor materials
 indeed most of them for human happiness!—It may
 be said however, that these are the proper subjects
 of history, according to the animated description,
 which Tacitus has given us of their historians; "*Qui
 veteres populi Romani res composuere, ingentia illi
 bella, expugnationes urbium, suas captosque reges &c.
 libero egressu memorabant:*" but yet if peace fell in
 their way, however unworthy a topic it's quiet arts
 might be for their bold style, they might surely
 deign to mention how long it continued, if it were
 only just to tell us, how many years passed without
 any thing happening worth their relating. When one
 sees therefore so little said about it, it seems reason-
 able to conclude, that there was not much opportu-
 nity for it.

seems to have been nearly the state, which this Kingdom was once in: but little do they deserve the happiness they now enjoy, who can suppose they should have been happier in such a situation, than they are at present!

As for Rome; If indeed the road, by which one set of men is to come at happiness, lies through the lives and fortunes of all others, Rome was the country in the world, of which one should have wished most to have been a citizen! But in what other view can one look upon this great Mistress of the Universe as peculiarly calculated to promote the well being of those, who were so idly proud of being called her sons? Deference perhaps to her grandeur, and reverence for those great names, which either supported her honor by their actions, or have since celebrated her praises in their writings, may make one fearful of saying any thing, that should seem to derogate from a merit so well established and so generally allowed: but whoever will read her history, without being dazzled either by the splendor of glory, or the authority of opinions; whoever will examine facts as they stand related by her own writers, (by whom

we are at least in no danger of being misled to her disadvantage,) and not as they appear, when dressed out by art in modern systems; will, I am persuaded, find instances enough to lessen his admiration of Roman greatness; enough to satisfy him, that however it might flatter the pride of men, it made them dearly pay, in the article of ease, for all the empty honor, it conferred upon them.

Scarce any thing indeed could be more various, or more different from itself at different periods, than this government was. But which of all the many forms, it successively put on, will allow us to say, it was well suited to the general good? If we look back to it's origin, we shall find it had a most unpromising beginning, being founded originally by a set of vagrants; who, from being private and separate Robbers, chose to commence public and united ones; who first seized upon a country, and then forced those, from whom they had taken it, to furnish them with the means of subsisting in it; and, if they refused this courteous request, made that refusal a sufficient pretence for fresh invasions upon their lives and properties. Not to insist however too much upon so unfavourable an outset, as sup-
porting

porting themselves by robbery, and increasing their numbers by ravishment, it must be owned, that afterwards they made large advances, far beyond the Greeks, in their attention to agriculture, and what is intimately connected with it, private property; though they seem in fact never thoroughly to have got rid of their first principles. As it was a nation begun in violence,* it always in some degree continued so: It consisted at one period, of a people without † liberty, at another,

* Livy calls it a city "*vi et armis conditam*;" and that it was maintained by the same principles, we have this general reason to conclude, that the temple of Janus was never shut, or they never were at peace all the time of the Republic, except once at the end of the first Punic war.

† Such a licentious rabble, as it's first citizens were made up of, could not be kept in any order but by the most severe laws: accordingly they enjoyed under their Kings a very sparing allowance of liberty; and even after they had expelled Tarquin the last of them, they seem for some time only to have exchanged one master for many. Livy himself approves the idea which Pyrrhus's Ambassador entertained of the Roman Senate, and says, "*Qui ex regibus constare dixit, unus veram speciem Romani Senatus cepit*"; though he means it no doubt as a compliment. At least, however the Patricians might be bettered in their condition by having shaken off this check upon their power and authority, the poor Plebeians received but little benefit from it.

ther, without any bounds to it; of a government either entirely arbitrary, or without any power; and never seems to have known the happy mean, at which the struggles of contending parties were too violent to stop; but always carried things far on the one side, or on the other, as they alternately happened to prevail.

Any attempt to introduce wholesome laws among them was commonly the cause of civil war and tumult: to appease which their usual recourse was to create a Magistrate * as absolute in his power, as the people

They afterwards indeed made themselves ample amends: and then the evil was as great on the other side, the Magistrates being stript of all power, to such a degree, as is scarce to be imagined. What can one think of that government, where the chief Magistrates had not power enough lodged in their hands, to apprehend and bring to punishment a traitor; one who was attempting to destroy the liberty of his country? Yet this we find was the case at Rome, from the defence which one of the Consuls makes in the case of Mælius, who was affecting even to be King. "Tum T. Quintius, consules immerito increpari, ait, qui constricti legibus de provocatione ad dissolvendum imperium latis, nequaquam tantum virum in Magistratu ad eam rem pro atrocitate vindicandam, quantum animi haberent. &c. Liv. lib. 4. cap. 13.

* This high Magistrate was however created for very different purposes; — sometimes to conquer a pro-

people were in their liberty: which in the end proved one great cause of their losing that inestimable blessing. It was, even in its best days, a nation of faction* and sedition; whose

province; — and sometimes both *He and his Master of Horse* were made for the important business of driving a nail. Liv. lib. 7. cap. 3. “*Senatus Dictatorem clavi figendi causa dici iussit. Dictus L. Manlius Imperiosus L. Pinarium Magistrum Equitum dixit.*”

† *Machiavel* indeed does not allow this, but seemingly for no other reason, than because he chooses to commend such an institution, as that of the Dictator was at Rome: for, if they had not had such an office, which gave men a taste of absolute power, and taught them in some degree how to maintain it, it seems probable, that they would never have had either a *Sylla* or a *Cæsar*. And a much greater authority, than that of *Machiavel*, has declared, “that it was this, that overturned the Roman Republic.” (*Montesquieu* :) though he allows it great merit, as a temporary expedient. And indeed in this patch-work policy of temporary expedients the greatest art of the Roman Senate seems to have consisted.

*We have this declaration from the wisdom of the Senate itself, that “*Dum Tribuni Consulesque ad se quisque omnia trahant, nihil relictum esse virium in medio, distractam laceratamque Rempublicam, magis quorum in manu sit, quam ut incolumis sit, querit.*” Neither can these distractions be fairly ascribed to the occasional efforts of a few ambitious and designing men, though frequently no doubt owing to that cause, and always heightened by it; but they were so uniform and constant, they must

whose peace and happiness depended upon the will of a mob; the will of which again depended upon the first mouthing declaimer, who would ascend the rostrum, and harangue them in a set of rounded periods and sounding phrases.

To keep peace at home, they were for ever obliged to have war abroad; and to carry off the turbulent humors, which licentiousness and ease engendered, they were con-

have flowed directly, or have had their first rise, from the unsettled, and indeterminate nature of the constitution itself. The force of their *Senatusconsulta*, *Plebisclta*, *Edicts*, &c. were perpetually varying. Sometimes the Consuls had the upperhand of the Tribunes; and then these again would get to such a degree of insolence, as to threaten a Consul with chains; turn out a Dictator; and prevent any Magistrates being chosen for five years together. “*Livinius Sextiusque Tribuni plebis relecti nullos Curules Magistratus creari passi sunt: eaque solitudo magistratuum per quinquennium urbem tenuit.*” Liv. Lib. VI. “*Ardens igitur Tribunus viatorem mittit ad Consulem; Consul Lictorem ad Tribunum.*” Id. lib. 2. “*Tandem omnibus Tribunis plebis in eum coortis, seu vi seu verecundia victus Dictatura abiit.*” (Manlius.) &c.

How little they knew how to make a proper use of ease at Rome, we have a striking instance in Liv. Lib. IV. cap. 12. beginning thus, “*sequitur hanc tranquillitatem rerum* (though it had lasted but two years) *annis multiplici clade ac periculo insignis, seditionibus, fame, &c.* And this famine in particular

continually sending their citizens to be let blood in foreign countries. Other nations have made war through prudence or ambition; but it was to the people of this a matter of necessity: and the greatness, at which by this means they arrived, is rather a proof of their domestic unhappiness, than any thing in their favor, how artfully soever their pride and their Poets have contrived to set it off, and to sing it up into a subject of envy. The world however has been as little obliged to them since, as it was when they made it the scene of their butchery and bloodshed; for in all probability it has been greatly owing to a faulty emulation of them in this real mark of Barbarism, that modern and more civilized nations have given so much into the horrid outrages of war.

That there breathed amongst them a most noble spirit of liberty, cannot be denied; but however this may deserve our imitation or applause, I know not whether we should pity them most for enjoying so little of

was so great, “that numbers of the common people, rather than endure the torment of living upon such conditions, having lost all hopes of support, voluntarily threw themselves into the Tiber and were drowned.”

of that blessing*, of whose worth they shewed themselves so sensible, or condemn them for their continual attempts to rob all others of it; as if conscious of their own want of it, they had determined to make up that deficiency by collecting together all the little share of liberty, which other nations enjoyed.

As they were without, or rather above trade, they had no means of growing rich, (which yet they were in general exceedingly desirous of doing, notwithstanding their boasted examples to the contrary) but by exorbitant † usury, plunder, and provincial

* After all the fine things, that have been said about it, what other notions can we form of their so much boasted *liberty*, but that it was something, which occasioned perpetual disputes between the Consuls and the Tribunes, the senate and the people? for as to any constitutional or fixt principles, on which it depended, few except those, who are determined at any rate to admire the stupendous fabric of the Roman Commonwealth, will have eyes sharp enough to discover them amidst such perpetual changes of Power and Privilege.

† To shew in what manner the business of debtor and creditor was carried on at Rome in it's early and boasted days of freedom, I shall mention but one instance; which, as it is most beautifully described by the Historian, and lays open to our view a good deal of their domestic situation, I shall beg leave to quote at full

governments; which two last, as they contrived it, were but in fact two different names for the same thing.

Hence

full length. Liv. Lib. II. cap. 23. "*Sed civitas secum ipsa discors intestino inter patres plebemque flagrabat odio; maxime propter nexos ob æs alienum: fremebant, se foris pro libertate et imperio dimicantes, domi a civibus captos et oppressos esse: tutioremque in bello quam in pace, inter hostes quam inter cives, libertatem plebis esse. Invidiamque eam suâ sponte gliscentem insignis unius calamitas accendit. Magna natu quidam cum omnium malorum suorum insignibus se in forum projecit. Obsita erat squalore vestis, foedior corporis habitus, pallore ac macie perempti. Ad hoc promissa barba et capilli efferaverant speciem oris. Nolentabatur tamen in tantâ deformitate, et ordines duxisse aiebant, aliaque militiæ decora vulgo, miserantes eum, jactabant. Ipse testes honestarum aliquot locis pugnarum, cicatrices adverso pectore ostentabat. Seiscitantibus unde ille habitus, unde deformitas, quum circumfusa turba esset prope in concionis modum; Sabino bello, ait, se militantem, quia propter populationes agri non fructu modo caruerit, sed villa incensa fuerit, direpta omnia, pecora abacta, tributo iniquo tempore imperato æs alienum fecisse: id cumulatam USURIS, primo se agro paterno avitoque exuisse, deinde fortunis aliis: postremo velut tabem pervenisse ad corpus. Ductum se ab creditore, non in servitium, sed in ergastulum et carnificinam esse. Inde ostentare tergum foedum recentibus vestigiis verberum, &c.*" To appease the clamors which such an appearance was likely to excite, one of the Consuls made an edict, quo edixit, "Ne quis civem Romanum vinctum aut clausum teneret, quominus ei nominis edendi apud Consules potestas fieret. Ne quis

Hence war was made a business of choice, as well as of necessity; — it became their trade, and their Generals and Soldiers were their richest citizens. This, with the spirit of emulation and strength of attachment, which always act most forcibly in unsettled states (and this was, in an eminent degree, the case of Rome, during all the time it continued a Republic) may perhaps account for the number of shining characters to be met with in their history; and for the great figure, which they made in the world for so many years.

They had some tolerable institutions, it must be owned, for the police and management of a city; but whatever happiness these might have procured them, had they been content with a small territory in Italy, enough
quis militis, donec in castris esset, bona possideret, aut venderet: liberos nepotesve ejus moraretur.” What a picture is this for those to look at, who envy the Romans their boasted liberty! Notwithstanding this edict however, (which indeed was never confirmed, the senate having sacrificed the credit of the Consul who made it, to their own pride) The unhappy Debtors found no relief for many years; till at length, on account of one of the most shameful instances of lust and cruelty, that ever was recorded, being practised upon one of their number, who was a youth of great beauty, that had surrendered himself prisoner to his creditor on account of his Father’s debts, their sufferings were taken into consideration, and somewhat abated. ♦

nough to have made them respectable amongst their neighbours ; they forfeited all this, by living in daily opposition to the very fundamental principles of their constitution ; by prosecuting that vain and delusive scheme of becoming the Lords and Masters of the Universe. It might be a temporary relief for them to make war, in order to get rid of some turbulent spirits ; but seasonable defeats would have been of much more service to them, than all their boasted conquests. The first by checking their ambition might have kept them in a state of independence ; the last, instead of making them the lords of others, made them slaves to themselves. Every triumph, that they celebrated, might be regarded as performing the obsequies of their own Liberty ; and their shouts of joy should have been changed into exclamations of sorrow !

I willingly pass over that dreadful period of this Republic, when *Proscription* and *Murder*, being let loose into their streets, wantonly ruined the fortunes, and cruelly ravaged the lives of their best citizens, to gratify the lust and glut the revenge of some of the worst ; when, as our incomparable *Shakespear* has it,

————— “ Good men’s lives
Expir’d before the flowers in their caps,
Dying or e’er they sicken’d ; ” —————

both

both because it is a scene, which must hurt humanity to dwell upon; and because it would probably be said, that these things happened at a time, when the Constitution was evidently breaking. I have also for a similar reason purposely omitted, what otherwise might seem no small proof of the weakness of their system; that, when by the bravery of a few, they had recovered their liberty out of the hands of a Tyrant, (who had wrested it from them by those very means, which they had entrusted to his care for its defence,) they could not preserve it; merely, as it should seem, because all traces of their former constitution were vanished, and there was not even the form of a government remaining for the fluctuating state to subside in, after these storms were over; though Cæsar before his death had been in quiet possession of his ill-got power for scarce five months.

I have however dwelt the longer upon this article of the Roman Government, because our own is so frequently and unjustly made to suffer in the comparison with it. — Let a structure indeed be only great, and however clumsy the architecture of it may be, it will always be stared and gazed at with wonder and

and applause. — If on the other hand, some should think, that by endeavouring to avoid this mistake, I had been tempted to treat this illustrious instance of human grandeur with rather too little respect; and should look upon those few strictures, which I have ventured to make upon it, as not sufficiently justified by the facts I have quoted in support of them; I would recommend it to such to reflect for a moment on the idea, which one, whose opinion should have much more weight with them than mine, has given of this Republic. “ *Rome étoit un vaisseau tenu par deux ancrés dans la tempête, la religion et les mœurs**.” — It must be owned the anchors, which are here assigned for it's security, are two of the best and strongest, that can be imagined: but surely a vessel in a storm, let it be held by whatever anchors you please, is such a situation, as no one would choose to be in, who was looking out in search of ease and happiness: And as it was with that view only, that I pretended to examine the merits of this government, I should hope, as far as authority can be any excuse for a mistake, I might stand free from any censure.

It

* L'Esprit des Loix. Liv. VIII. Chap. 13.

It might notwithstanding be comparatively happy to be a citizen of Rome, rather than a subject of any of those unfortunate countries, whose liberties she trampled on; and whose very princes sometimes, to give a licentious mob a holiday, were drawn through her proud streets at the chariot wheels of a haughty Conqueror: nay, we may allow perhaps, that it must be happier to have been a Roman, than to have lived in any other state, which either then, or had before, existed: but what comparison can there be between the happiness to be met with in one of our modern well-regulated governments, and that which Rome could confer on it's vain citizens? Rome! which, whatever other circumstances it might have to boast of, had always this dreadful draw-back upon happiness attending it, that it was scarce ever free from some remarkable calamity or other. *When things were tolerably quiet both from sedition and war, says the historian *, lest we should at any time be free from fears and dangers of some sort or other, a most grievous pestilence arose.*

Far then from affronting my own country so much, as to suppose there could be any room
for

* Livy. "*Et ab seditione et a bello quietis rebus, ne quando a metu et periculis vacarent, pestilentia ingens orta.*"

for a comparison between it and Rome in the article of happiness, I would venture to assert, that if a man regarded principally a quiet passage through this world, with a comfortable subsistence, whilst he staid in it, he had better even be a *Dutchman* with all the contempt that character has lately fallen into, than have been a *Roman*, when that name implied all that was great and glorious.

Plagues, famines, and such alarming visitations are not indeed confined to any particular country; but may no doubt be properly regarded as the common instruments of God's moral government: they are not however so far such, as to be no way subject to the controul of human powers: if they were, how could we account for their happening most frequently, and their effects being always the most violent in the worst regulated states*? When therefore people have well considered, how far the rise and increase of these calamities depend upon the

* If some should be inclined to look upon these evils as always inflicted merely for the punishment of sins; it is to be hoped, they would at the same time allow, that this would prove there were more of these and greater too in such sort of states, than in those, which are more civilized. With which allowance the argument would stand almost as much in my favor, as before.

the imperfection of the state, where they happen; when they have also well weighed of what importance the being secure from them is to human happiness; and when they have farther compared their frequency in different governments; they will, I am persuaded, have little doubt remaining, whether our modern European Governments do not far excel, in the article of *comfortable Subsistence* at least, not only those we have been considering, but all others, that either have formerly been, or are at present in being among the ruder parts of mankind.

The consideration of what effects different climates may produce in these instances, will make no alteration in the state of this argument; since the same government will always be attended with a greater or less number of these calamities, according to the different stages of perfection it has arrived at, as plainly appears from the tenor of all history. *

As to *Security* and *Liberty*, we should perhaps, to be exact, consider them in the two-fold

* One would not ask a question, which should be thought to tempt God; but one may surely ask, without incurring any suspicion of impiety, whether it is likely, that a fire, of the same nature with that in 1666, happening now in London would spread as far, as that did?

fold view of *internal* and *external*. Thus the Dutch enjoy a considerable share of liberty *within*, whilst *without* they seem to live in a most servile dependence upon their neighbours. But taking things in the gross, we may form a tolerable guess, from the view we have taken of their governments, in what degree the Ancients possessed these blessings. Had they however enjoyed them in much greater perfection than they did, we could hardly envy them the possession, when we know at how dear a rate they bought it. Ease, happiness, and life itself, are a high price to pay for any thing: and, when the purchase is made, to be obliged to hold it on that worst of tenures, war and military service, makes a large deduction indeed from it's value!

War in it's mildest aspect cannot be looked upon by humanity, without horror and aversion! but with us it may really seem to have put on a tame and gentle appearance, compared to it's former fierceness. Amongst the Ancients the loss of victory was the loss of every thing: liberty, property, wives, children, every right as men, and sometimes even life itself, were forfeited by those, who could not maintain them by the strength of their sword. When armies engaged on such terms as these, we cannot suppose,

pose, that victory would be easily given up; or that it would not be pursued with cruelty and carnage; a circumstance, which should make a considerable abatement in our admiration of that courage they have been so highly praised for, since in all probability despair was most commonly it's genuine parent. In Greece too (and at Rome, till by the amazing success of it's arms there were no neighbouring enemies left to disturb it) the mischiefs and miseries of war must have been still more sensibly felt, as it was always carried on almost at their own doors, and the whole nation were eye-witnesses of, and bore an immediate part in the distress it occasioned: though by being inured to it they did not perhaps suffer so much, as we might apprehend: nay, they seem sometimes to have entered into these broils almost for sport, to flesh their young heroes and give their soldiers a little air and exercise! — The more civilized and more respectable states of Europe, on the contrary, have not felt the calamities of war in their own territories, at least to any degree, now for many years: — they have sagely chose out a kind of pit to decide their quarrels upon, at a distance from home. — But, O unhappy people, who are thus condemned to bear the ills, occasioned by the pride and injustice

of

of others, for what crime of yours is this evil come upon you! — Is it because you already inhabit one of the worst countries in Europe, that they envy you your hard fare, and so cruelly rob you of your poor provision! — Or is it, that the fell spirit of war has begun at length to relent a little of it's fury, and being ashamed any longer to lay waste the labors of art and industry, where a more perfect civilization has taken place, is content to skulk and hide itself amidst fens and marshes! How must one wish, that the inconveniences attending those, who pursue it there, may dispose them still more to listen to the voice of peace; and that the present violent efforts, which the contending parties are on all sides making, may be the last struggles and dying agonies of the monster War!

Ill should I deserve the name of Englishman, if I did not prize liberty as the highest of all earthly blessings. Still therefore, if you please, let her be worshipped even as a goddess! but surely it is high time to cease offering up to her so many human sacrifices!

Mr. Rousseau prophetically says *, that "*national enmity will soon be extinct: but, he adds with seeming concern, it will be with*

* Page 9.

the love of our country †". — Happy would it be for the world, if men could get rid of the first without the loss of the other! though perhaps the parting even with this might not be attended with such bad consequences, as he seems to apprehend. What a glorious character would a true citizen of the world be! — And if we trace the progress of government from it's first rise in a single family perhaps, to a city, a commonwealth, a kingdom; who can say, that it may not end at last in a much more comprehensive form? if universal monarchy has a bad sound, suppose it be a large fœderative community!

War can only be justified by considering it as a necessary means to defend ourselves in the possession of some rights, essential to our happiness, which others either have not,
or

† How the love of our country, which is plainly the offspring of society, carefully nursed up by the cunning and contrivance of those, who were desirous of maintaining the forms of government, under which they lived, happens to have interested Mr. *Rousseau* so far in it's favor, as to make him solicitous for it's continuance, one is rather at a loss to guess. — As in general he seems to think society has done so much harm in the world, one should conclude, that to keep up a consistency, he would say, the sooner it was dissolved the better — if then the love of our country has any share in supporting it, why is he so alarmed at the likelihood of it's being lost?

or want to take from us. But if all mankind were arrived at an equal, or even a tolerable degree of civilization, and were possessed of equal, or nearly equal rights and privileges; what would it signify, where one was born, or of what particular district one became a citizen? — Not but that there would always remain, upon any supposition, attachment enough to our native country to answer any good purpose. And if genuine christianity had taken place, uncorrupted by depraved systems and political abuses; who can say, by that extensive benevolence, which it teaches, of considering all mankind as brethren, nay as members one of another, how near it might already have brought the world to the state, we have been contemplating? — The prospect, which such a view of things lays open to the mind, would be a most pleasing one to dwell upon; but I have already digressed too far.

To return then; something perhaps in favor of former policy, and to the disadvantage of such improvements as I have been speaking of, may be collected from the great populousness * of antient states, — But what will

* In which article however they, who have read Mr. *Hume's* very sensible and ingenious essay on the subject, will think proper perhaps to make considerable abatements.

will the argument of populoufness, allowed to the utmost extent, prove at last? — States may breed men, as the Scotch and Irish do cattle, merely for sale; to dispose of them for slaves; or to let them out to fight for pay. If an easy provision for children encourages population, what method of providing for them can be so easy, as to get them presently knocked on the head? But surely the above conditions of existence neither proves the happiness of the individuals, who are condemned to them, nor the perfection of those states, which give birth to such miserable beings. And it would be well if the warm advocates for population, whose zeal however is highly commendable, would determine with a little more precision, than they hitherto have, or possibly soon will do, how far the numbers of men in a community may be increased, consistently with the good of the whole. They should be able to tell us with the same accuracy, which guides the skillful gardener or nursery-man, how many of these plants will grow in a particular spot, without injury to each other. They should tell us, how many may be crouded into a narrow space, without destroying each other's growth and health; without introducing

ducing plagues and pestilential disorders. It may be easy to see, where desolation takes place, and that it is an evil, which wise governors especially should by all means strive to remedy: but it is not so easy to know, when we have got a just proportion. Should we be as many, as may be supported by the produce of the earth in a fruitful season? What then is to become of us in a less plentiful year? Should we be as many, as may live upon the ordinary encrease of cattle amongst us? what is to be our fate, should an accidental distemper destroy their numbers? It is no doubt the will, and was the first command of Heaven, that we should "encrease and multiply;" but it is only till we have "replenished the earth:" which surely we cannot construe to mean "without all bounds," or, "till we have overstocked it." If our own sense will not teach us this, reverence for the wisdom of Him, who gave this precept, should persuade us to believe it. People may admire, if they please, the populousness of China; but it seems to me a degradation of the species to make men live, as they are said to do there, like the lowest of animals, on refuse and carrion.

Some

Some may fancy also, that the love of country, and great strength of attachment, which was shewn by the ancients to their governments, is another proof in their favor; as if those constitutions could not be bad ones, which were capable of engaging the affections of their members in so strong a degree. But they, who fancy this, will not be such, as have with any degree of attention considered, what sort of things are capable of forming the strongest attachments to them. They, who will attentively look at the different governments and different sects of religion, that have been in the world; far from collecting any thing in their favor from the zeal and bigotry of those, who live under them, will perhaps be inclined to conclude, that the more imperfect any of these have been, the more strenuous have their advocates been in defending them. Just as it is seen in families, where if there be a child more weakly or less worthy than the rest, it is usually in the same proportion, the favorite of it's fond parents : perhaps, because it requires more of their attention and care to rear it, or make it good for any thing; and whilst they are bestowing the necessary pains to this purpose, it insensibly steals into their favor and affections.

But

But be this as it may; is it not true, that every particular mode and sect of Christianity has been more strenuously espoused, and more industriously defended, than Christianity itself, except by it's early assertors, who were clearly influenced by more than human feelings? Yet even in those early times, it may be collected from the account of an Apostle himself, that many were more anxious to be thought "of Paul, or of Apollos", than of Christ. Have not bigots always proceeded with a more fiery heat in their disputes with each other, than in those against the common enemy? * And may we not farther assert, that the zeal of each sect, in propagating it's tenets, has always risen the higher in those instances, where they bore the least resemblance to Christianity? how indeed can we otherwise account for the success, which many of these sects have had

* In a country, where that utmost disgrace to all humanity and religion, the INQUISITION obtains, and charitably anticipates the punishments of Hell, by inflicting them here upon earth; had not any one, whose misfortune it was to live there, better be suspected of atheism, than of heresy? And if he respected his temporal ease and quiet only, would it not be safer for him even to blaspheme God, than to speak any thing disrespectful of his HOLINESS the POPE?

had in the world; but that the devisers of them had let their notions down to a certain pitch of absurdity and imperfection, suited to the tastes and palates of those who should embrace them?

However, not to insist more than is necessary on so tender a topic, as people's religious prejudices; let us turn the subject to the point from whence we set out, from religion to the state.

One may ask then, who ever shewed a greater degree of attachment, than the Loy-
alists of our own country in King Charles the First's time? But to what was their attachment shewn? — To a set of principles, which are not only a disgrace to our most excellent constitution, if it once was so indeterminate as to afford any just grounds for them; but to human nature itself, which could ever be weak enough to embrace them; — To the worst and meanest of all principles, *passive obedience, divine hereditary indefeasible right*, and a prerogative founded upon that right, which was to do, whatever it pleased, with our lives, liberties, and every thing else, that is most valuable and dear to us. It cannot be said, that the attachment to liberty and better principles was stronger than

than this. The cause indeed of liberty, as it was called, did in the end prevail; but it was not the spirit of liberty, I doubt, that either dictated the covenant, or by which Cromwell attached the minds of his followers to *the good old Cause*.

To close then at last this long disquisition; whatever merit Greece or Rome may have, what other satisfactory reason can be assigned, why their governments should excell modern ones, but this; that they had much wiser lawgivers, and more learned philosophers, than we have? the contrary of which it is to be hoped, has been in some degree already proved. Of this however we may be sure, that if their governments were better calculated to promote the happiness of their members; it could only be, because they made them more virtuous, than our's; a point, which is to be enquired into hereafter. — In the mean time, it may not be amiss to look a little more narrowly after what has been so frequently called our happiness; to see whether in fact there be any such thing, and in what it principally consists; that we may be better satisfied how far improvements in the world have a tendency to promote it.

CHAP. VI.

Of Happiness.

I Cannot repeat the title, on which I am going to write, without reflecting, how many thousands are at this very instant *practically* engaged in the same inquiry! — by how many various ways too are they all pursuing the same end! — view those two ships there with their bended sails! from whatever port they came, or how different soever the courses may be, which they seem to steer, Happiness is the harbour, to which they both are bound! with whatever goods they may be freighted, wherever they may be driven by storms or adverse winds, or on whatever coast they may accidentally touch; this at last is the haven, where both the pilots and all the passengers on board desire to be!

Not only those however, “who go down to the sea in ships,” are engaged in this pursuit; — nor does happiness dwell particularly on foreign shores, whatever expectations men may have to find her there; — she is sought for with the same zeal, and perhaps with better success much nearer home!

Every

Every individual in short of our whole species, in whatever occupation they may be separately employed; whether they are digging, fighting, waiting behind a counter, or studying in a closet; all are paying their court to the same sovereign mistress of their wishes; and these various employments are but so many different methods of suing for her favor.

Must we conclude then with the surly Moralist, that they are all mistaken; that they are all in search of nothing but disappointment?—Why, O Gracious Creator, Author and Parent of every good, Why are we taught to look upon the life thou hast given us, as only a gloomy passage through a vale of misery and sorrow? From which if we turn aside ever so little, either to the right hand or to the left, into those flowery plains, or tempting groves, which every now and then appear to our view, and invite our approach, we shall meet with nothing but vexation; instead of flowers we shall gather thorns; and if we offer to taste that specious fruit, which looks so alluring to the eye; like the apples of Sodom it will fill our mouth with dust and ashes! — what is still more hard, even in this dreary path, in which it seems

we are appointed to walk, unless we are perpetually upon our guard, with eyes for ever fixt upon our steps; — nay, unless we are favored with some superior assistance and direction, we are liable every moment to fall into a variety of traps and snares, which an enemy has set in our way; and in the end to have those temporary evils, with which we find it now so difficult to struggle, changed into others infinitely worse, and confirmed upon us by a perpetual decree for ever!

Reflect a little, ye who pretend to measure out infinite goodness by your own contracted dispositions, what good purpose these lessons of your's are calculated to answer! Why would you restrain God's mercy to some distant period for it's exertion? Or why would ye have us think, that to become fit objects of it we must be wretched? Was it misery that recommended us to our kind Creator's care, e'er yet we had a being? Or did his kindness cease with that single act? Are we not on the contrary repeatedly told, in a number of expressions to the same effect, which abound in every page of the Scriptures, "that the Lord has pleasure in the prosperity of his servants" and "that he hath given us richly all things to enjoy"? Why then

then would ye lessen his benefits in our estimation; or deter us from using them? Can ye imagine, that teaching us to think lightly of his present bounty is the likeliest method to make us thankful for it, or to rely upon him with greater confidence for future favours? Surely the more sensible we are of the worth of any thing, the more gratitude we must always retain towards the giver of it, and the more desirous shall we be of preserving it; or, if we must needs part with it for a time, the more solicitous shall we be to regain it hereafter. He alone who looks upon his life as a curse, can want to throw it away, or be indifferent, whether ever he shall receive it again!

Far therefore from considering ourselves as placed in a condition, like that of Tantalus, where the means of happiness are only thrown in our way to mock and disappoint us, we may surely make the following conclusions; — that it is to the Goodness of God we owe our present existence; in which it was his gracious intention, we should be as happy, as in such a situation we are capable of being: — that whatever our reason recommends to us upon a fair examination, as having a tendency to improve our

circumstances, will, if properly used, have that effect to a certain degree: — and that he, who endeavours to make himself and others the happiest he can, pays the greatest honor, and performs the most acceptable service to his Creator; whose all-seeing wisdom can as easily judge of our comparative merit by our using properly the means of happiness, which his bounty has bestowed, as by our submitting chearfully to those evils, which imperfection must needs bring with it.

If there be such a thing as happiness here below; or, to soften the phrase as much as may be for those, who are out of humor with it; — if there be any thing, which makes one mode of existence preferable to another, or can render the same sort more perfect; why should it be thought so deeply hid from our sight, as that we should never be able to discover it, or in the least to penetrate through the thick cloud, that surrounds it? With an eye capable of discerning almost every thing else, why should man be made blind to that alone, which it concerns him chiefly to know? — That he may frequently forget the end he should pursue; and that he may still more frequently
mistake

mistake the means, which he should use for the attainment of this end, is what may easily be expected from the many frailties of his nature. But that this should always, or even generally be the case, — seems neither to be consistent with the goodness of God, nor with the character of a rational creature.

Every one therefore, who is engaged in any pursuit, that is not vicious, — that does not interfere with the just rights or known good of another; whatever occasional mistakes or miscarriages he may fall into, may reasonably hope, upon the whole, to promote not only his own present happiness, but that of all others, as far as the little circle, of which he is the center, reaches. Society could not, without a miracle, be upheld on any other supposition: at least it seems entirely agreeable to the other instances of kindness, which the Deity has shewn to his creatures, that whatever he has made necessary for their well-being, should be attended with some degree of pleasure, even in the very performance of it.

In what particular profession or course of life happiness is most likely to be found, is not a point so easy to determine. What however was intended as a general good, would

not, it is probable, be confined to any particular situation, to be come at only by a single avenue. Happiness therefore we may suppose, is to be met with both in the city, and in the country; in the palace, and in the cottage; nor does she intirely avoid either the barren heath, or more unwholesome marshes. If there be any particular path, that would bring us more directly to her principal dwelling; it is wisely hid from common observation: it might otherwise be so crouded, that the travellers would hinder each other's progress. How would the other offices of life be filled; if it was known, that happiness was annexed to one alone? — If to be a poet or a philosopher, was to be happy; who would be a merchant or a soldier?

It is however extremely probable, that more happiness is to be found in one way of life, than another; though at the same time so constituted is human nature, that this can never be generally known, or believed to be true. So various are the dispositions and tempers of men, you might as soon persuade them all to like one and the same sort of food, as to make them all think alike in the article of happiness. Hence
the

the being freed from uncertainty in this instance is a piece of knowledge, which, if it could be had, would be of no use to mankind; unless either their nature was intirely altered, or it could be shewn, that their greatest happiness consisted in something, which might be carried on, and attended to, consistently with their other pursuits.

But notwithstanding the unpromising appearance of such an attempt, abundance of pains has been taken to point out and recommend several different things as productive of our greatest good. There are as many *summum Bonum's* or *greatest Goods* to be met with in the systems of old philosophers, as there are *best* horses and *best* dogs to be heard of in the discourses of some modern Sportsmen. Each have their favourites, which they would have every body else believe to be the best in the world. And though there may not be perhaps, and it might be difficult to say which of the two parties would least choose to have it thought there was, much resemblance between them in other particulars; yet whichever of them may be looked upon as injured by the comparison, they are both wonderfully alike in carrying on their disputes with great warmth, and

abundance of words; whilst all that can be gathered, on either side, from their warmest commendations, and eagerest contentions, is only the strength of their own persuasion: for where many things are nearly equal, it must be almost impossible to point out such a pre-eminence in any one, as shall not be liable to some controversy in favour of the others.

It may be immaterial to trace out the spring from whence one of these parties have derived their mistake; but that of the others seems plainly to have arisen from too narrow and confined a view of what constitutes human happiness: — men have been fond in this, as in many other instances, of giving too great a degree of uniformity and simplicity to what has in itself extremely little of either. Hence the many fine-spun schemes for happiness, which different philosophers, according to the peculiar cast of their own temper and disposition, have drawn out with immense application, and from their great love for human kind have given to the world, as clues to conduct us through the mazy paths, that lead to the fancied residence of true and sincere pleasure: — which it were endless, as well as needless to recount.

But

But the happiness of such a compound Being, as man is, cannot well be supposed to depend on any one single, or even on any few simple principles: like his life, and indeed like almost every thing else that belongs to him, it must be a kind of aggregate made up of many various, and even opposite materials: to reckon up all of which, and assign each their proper share in this business, would require a degree of nicety and skill, far beyond what I affect to be master of. Some of the principal parts however are so plain and obvious, that we can hardly be mistaken in them. Such are the following; that as a *sensible* and a *rational* Being, man's happiness must consist in the perfection of his senses, and the improvement of his reason; as a *social* and *dependent* one, in virtue, religion, and the good order of society.

If this be the case, we must extend the ground plan of happiness a little farther, than has usually been done. — However inferior in point of ingenuity this method of building may seem, when compared to that where a fine fabric, by the cunning contrivance of the Architect, is made to rest on one single prop, or point; yet what is lost in elegance by this means, will, one may reasonably hope, be made up in strength and stability. One may de-

define happiness then to be the sum of agreeable or pleasant perceptions, hopes, reflexions and expectations, which any one enjoys.

To know however, whether any man is to be reckoned happy on the whole; we must subtract from this sum every thing he meets with of an opposite kind; which, alas! will often make too large a deduction! But, if existence be a blessing, (which I imagine is a point, that will not be much controverted, at least by those who think it the gift of a benevolent Creator; setting aside at present the precarious arguments which are drawn from appearances, and which make either for or against this question, according to the skill of him, who draws them;) we may conclude in general, if not in every particular instance, that there will be a balance of something positive on the side of happiness.

If we are farther curious to know, whether one man is happier, than another; we must enquire, whether this balance on stating the account, other things being alike, is larger in one case, than in the other:— and if the sums be equal, whether, and in what degree, the quality is different. For, supposing every one's life to be so nearly divided between pleasure and pain, as that there shall only be one moment's surplussage

left on the side of pleasure; yet in that moment how exquisite might the enjoyments of one man be! How flat and insipid those of another! — Increase the numbers on each side of the account to whatever length you will, the difference at the bottom, between the largest and smallest sums, may be no more, than one; — yet the different worth, or excellence of that one, may be as great, as it is in our common accounts, when the same figure stands in the place of units, or in that of thousands. And this difference may arise either from the quickness of sense, which people are indued with, or from the value of those objects, which they are contemplating.

On the same principles, we may prosecute our inquiry a little farther, into the different degrees of happiness, allotted to different kinds of existence.

That Being which has no feelings (if such may be called a Being) must as to happiness be in a state of absolute quiescence or suspension: — that is, as it can enjoy neither one nor the other, it's happiness and misery may each be represented by 0. Indue it with one degree of perception, and it becomes immediately capable of happiness or misery, as that sense meets with objects agreeable or disagreeable;

agreeable; — the balance however by supposition being always something positive on the side of happiness, we will suppose it, in this first instance, to be equal to 1. If another sense be added, like the former, opening a second avenue to pleasure and pain; the result, in this case as well as in the other, being a degree of positive pleasure, it will follow, that a Being, indued with two senses, is happier than that, which has only one: and so we might assert of those, which have 3, 4, or 5 of these inlets; each of them, as it is limited to an inferior number, being always to be reckoned less happy, than that which is next above it.

One necessary limitation must however always be attended to in this case, that both the number and degrees of perception in any being must be such, as are suited to the particular frame and situation of it; — in the proper adjustment of which, the wisdom of the contriver will be most clearly seen. — The happiness of a mole might be ruined by the sense of sight; — or, to borrow the philosophy of the poet,

The Lamb thy riot dooms to bleed to day;
Had he thy reason; would he skip and play?

An Angel might, and probably would, be less happy, than we are, was he confined to

our particular circumstances and situation. Just as the connoisseur, who was banished to Siberia, might be made wretched by his fine feelings and delicate sensibility.

But with respect to man at large, he has not only the power of bettering himself, but also the things around him; and they both usually mend together; it having been our Creator's kind care thus to provide for us a continual increase of happiness.

What is true too of the number of senses, must be true also of their degrees of perfection; so that if they are either by nature more perfect, in one Being than another, or are capable of being made so by art, the pleasure perceived by them will be more intense. How much more sensible for instance must the pleasure be, which a musical ear, or an eye of taste receives, than what is felt by the gross, uninformed organ of the multitude? This however must be understood with the same restriction, as was made above; — for was this musical ear condemned to suffer the perpetual grating of a stone-cutter's yard, or the harsh noise of a razor-grinder's wheel; it would but little increase the happiness of it's possessor: — nor would an eye of taste, tied down to the single contemplation of

Hockley

Hockley in the Hole, and it's environs, bring in much pleasure to it's master.

As a farther abatement still to this reasoning, some will perhaps say, that, when the clown stares, with gaping admiration, at the new dawbed sign, which my Landlord at the Lion has just hung out, it is a Guido or a Raphael to him: — and when he listens to the Love-Ditty, chaunted in alternate strains cross the street, between the hoarse Ballad-finger and his shriller mate, his enjoyments are as great, as the philosopher's would be to hear the music of the spheres.

If such sayings deserve any serious answer; we may observe, that to the clown there is but one thing, and he can hardly tell even what that is, which strikes his admiration: whereas the improved eye and ear can discover a thousand circumstances of design, disposition, harmony, proportion, contrast, &c. besides a thousand other nameless graces, strokes, and touches, which make them devour, with such eager and greedy attention, those pieces, which challenge their regard.

What has been affirmed of the number and degrees of perceptions, holds true also of the number of objects and their quality. And hence we see how Music, Painting, Statuary,

tuary, all the plastic, and diversifying Arts * tend to promote the happiness of mankind; and of the same tendency must riches, honors, and all the other creatures of civil life be reckoned.— They may be faultily pursued, or abused, when obtained; and so may nature's gifts, health and food; but this, as has been before observed, tends not in the least to prove, that the things themselves are bad.

To make then a general conclusion, one may affirm, that the world at large is capable of bestowing more happiness on it's inhabitants, according to the degrees of improvement made in it; —and that every particular

* Some of these arts may possibly injure the health of those individuals, who are immediately employed in the execution of them; but nothing can be more groundless than Mr. *Rousseau's* general censure mentioned page 20; “en devenant sociable il devient foible, craintif, &c. et sa manière de vivre acheve d'enlever sa force et son courage:” they must be strong arguments indeed, which could induce one to believe that society and domestic life tend to enfeeble the strength or diminish the courage of mankind, when matter of fact seems plainly on the other side; the civilized Europeans being stronger in general, and more capable of enduring labor and hardships, than the natives of North America: and as much as an open engagement with an enemy, in a fair field of battle, is more honorable than bush-fighting, so much do they also exceed them in the article of courage.

lar man is, or may be happy, in † proportion to the advantages, whether of nature or of art, which he enjoys; — and farther, as intelligence is the greatest distinction, that can be enjoyed; one may venture to assert, that all knowledge, of whatever kind it be, not only that, which has plainly a connexion with use and practice, but even the most abstract and speculative, if it only tends to enlarge a man's perceptions, promotes his happiness. So that, other circumstances being alike, he, who knows the most, will always be the happiest man.

This

† This proportion however is not to be rated according to what a man may expect from these advantages beforehand, as fancy and opinion are extremely apt to outrun sound judgement; but according to their real values, which they all undoubtedly have.

I am not ignorant, how great a draw-back this makes in my account. But when I set out to consider Man's happiness; I did not forget, that he had passions and appetites, or that these, however they may occasionally either hinder or promote his good, would frequently make him act in a manner very different from common expectation; all therefore, which I ever meant to assert, was only this; that so far as he can be looked upon as a rational creature, and so far as reason can be supposed to have an influence in determining his actions, he will be happier in proportion to the knowledge, which he himself and others, among whom he is placed, have acquired.

Manners and Principles. III

This reasoning however must not be extended to other animals, who are not masters of themselves*. A *Chien Savant* may, for ought I know, be the most miserable of his species; — the knowledge, which is taught him, is imposed upon him by a kind of violence, and is of no use, when learnt. Beings, whose faculties are of a certain, definite extent, must act within the sphere, which is measured out to them by that extent; — but to what bounds shall we limit such a Being, as shews in himself an evident capacity of acquiring daily new degrees of perfection, and of enlarging the former circle, which circumscribed his powers?

There is no knowledge, (at least none that can be attained by the use of his own faculties) which can be said to be improper for such a Being; and such a Being is man: consequently, the farther he looks back into what is past; — and the more clearly he perceives what is to come; — the

* It is far however from being true, that the mere taming these animals for domestic use does such an injury to them either in their beauty, strength or agility, as Mr. *Rousseau* seems to lay to it's charge p. 20. the philosopher's cat might perhaps just then appear a little dull and drowsy; but had he turned his eyes towards the generous steed in training: — he would certainly have altered his opinion.

—the more in short he thinks upon God, nature, and himself; — the better is he enabled to set a right value upon things; and the better does he know, what fears are groundless, and what hopes he may with safety cherish; that is, how to banish uneasiness, and to be happy.

Neither is there any thing in this, which is inconsistent with their being extremely happy; who know much less, and who never look beyond the narrow sphere, in which they move. To them, who know no better, what they have is best. The inhabitant of Nova Zembla, who knows nothing of the earth's shape, or of the inclination of it's orbit to it's axis, and who never left his native soil; may fancy, that his half year's night is no longer, than what is common; and that he enjoys as much of the sun's chearing rays, as any other inhabitant upon the globe. But yet this will not prove, that those, who are *born under a better sun* and live in a *happier* climate, are not more indebted to nature's kindness, than he is.

The rock-adhering Oyster, it is possible, if it thinks at all, may think, that nothing is capable of a higher degree of motion, or is endued with brighter parts, than it enjoys;

joys; though the utmost stretch of these can reach no farther, than merely to the opening of it's shell, at stated times, to suck in food and nutriment. But who would reckon it any proof, that man was of no nobler make, nor designed for any higher enjoyments, than this almost vegetable animal, because it might possibly think so?

With what infinite satisfaction does the illustrious King of Manacabo * assert, "that

* In a Paper said to be an extract from the Preamble of a Treaty, between this great Potentate and our East-India Company, are contained, amongst others of the same nature, the following most pompous declarations on his part; — "I the said King am a very high King: — I am Lord of all Sumatra: — I am such a King, that, under the sun, there is no such King like unto me: — the whole world is mine, and I am the owner thereof; — what was nobody's hitherto, is mine." The proofs which he brings in support of this assumed dignity, are some of them pleasant enough; — "I have an enchanted cock, that sings but three times in a year, which I found on the coast of China; that nobody has such a cock, as I have. — I have a knife, that has but one edge, which nobody may use, except myself; — the gold of my mine is of twelve colours: — I have an iron cap and a baiu, that forty men cannot carry; but I have a soldier, that can carry them; and that nobody has such another soldier, as I have," &c. — If men can seriously talk thus; can act under such persuasions; and yet at the same time be thought in

* H

their

no King is so great a King, as he is?" Yet something more must be necessary to prove this, besides the strength of his own persuasion; or otherwise, we could turn out some twenty or thirty straw-throned Kings, whose whole dominions extend no farther, than the walls of their cells; and whose only subjects are the vermin, which inhabit there; who yet, if opinion would prove the point, are far greater Kings, than even this mighty monarch of Manacabo!

their sound mind; might it not make an ingenious problem to determine, at what precise point of irrationality madness commences?

CHAP. VI.

Of an Equality in Happiness.

IT is however a favorite position with some, that there is an equal share of happiness in all states of life. To prove this, they shew great ingenuity in picking out every little spot and blemish, which may abate the splendor, or cast a kind of shade upon the bright side of fortune's favors; and are curious to place in the most striking point of view, every the minutest circumstance, which may recommend, or set off, what otherwise might appear to be the less eligible lots. Their design too in this seems laudable: they would reconcile men to the situations, in which they are placed; and would give them favorable sentiments of God's dealings with them.

But notwithstanding this fair appearance:—notwithstanding we must with them allow, that there is not such a very enviable difference among the various conditions of life, as man's wayward fancy is too apt to suggest; and though we may farther own, that the higher we ascend, however we may increase our prospect, and command a larger circle of pleasures and enjoyments, than those, who are placed in the vale below; yet our
H 2 situation

situation becomes, in proportion more dangerous, and is exposed to many a storm and tempest; which the other is secure from. Whatever concessions may be made in these and such like points; yet unless there still remain a very considerable difference in the article of happiness, between one mode of existence and another; for what purpose can the Deity have bestowed such various degrees of perfection on his creatures?

For upon the same principles, which are brought to shew that such a difference does not obtain between one man and another*; it would be easy to prove, that it does not subsist between a man, and the beast, on which he rides; nor between the horse, and the poor reptile, which at the next step he will trample into dust.

And, though it may answer very good purposes to humble men into a mean opinion of this world's goods, and of this life's happiness, when compared to the transcendent joys of another; yet we shall go beyond our purpose, if we do not still let it be
thought

* "*Homini homo quid præstat! Stulto intelligens quid interest!*" Are sentences however, which, if they could be divested of the comic humor so long annexed to them, would be found to contain maxims of true philosophy.

thought a blessing; and such a one, as may well claim our utmost gratitude to the giver of it, even for his present bounty, exclusive of any farther prospect. But if we reduce it to so low an estimation, as to think it of no higher worth, than what a worm enjoys; how weak and faint must our gratitude needs be!

Besides, the surest, if not the only ground of expecting future happiness (exclusive of a direct promise) seems to be the certainty of possessing some share of it at present. For what reason can we have to think, that the Deity will ever make us happy, if he has not already done it? But if he has made us happy at present, we have the fairest prospect of always continuing so, where-ever we exist. -- And if we are to be more happy hereafter, what can so effectually persuade us to believe this, as the experience of finding ourselves and all the world around us, daily growing so at present?

It would be well then, if men would be a little more cautious in advancing things for principles, which in their practice they must needs contradict. For let their words be what they will, nature has taken care to make them fond of their existence, and of enjoying it in the best manner, they can.

CHAP. VII.

Of what is called the State of Nature.

BUT they, who contend for a decline in human affairs, may still tell us, that Nature, who knew best how to consult for the good of her offspring, had placed us in a very different state from that, in which we now are: and that consequently we have forfeited all claim to happiness at her hands, by * quitting that *simple, uniform, and solitary* manner of living, which she had prescribed to us.

It becomes necessary therefore to inquire, what may be properly called a state of Nature; and how far she may be said to have prescribed any thing to us in this case.

The state, in which mankind should make their first appearance, must indeed have been almost necessarily such an one, as is above described; unless they had sprung up all at once, like Cadmus's men, armed at all points, in full perfection both of body and mind, and

* Mr. Rousseau ascribes all the evils we endure to this origin; almost all of which, he says, we should have avoided, "en conservant la maniere de vivre *simple, uniforme, et solitaire*, qui nous étoit prescrite par la nature." See above page 109.

and completely furnished with all truths and arts requisite, if not to promote, at least to preserve their well being. For otherwise Nature, by appointing a kind of infancy for the world, as well as for mankind in it, will appear to have prescribed very differently, in this respect, from what she is above said to have done: and it would be as absurd to suppose, that she intended we should stop there in the one, as in the other instance; since she has plainly furnished the means, or rather has almost imposed a necessity, of advancing to an age of greater strength, perfection, and maturity in both cases.

Every different state then, which mankind have either passed through, or at present make their appearance in, has almost an equal claim to the title of *a state of nature*: since it can have been nothing but nature, in one sense or another, which has placed them there. If any in particular however is to be distinguished by this name, as being more peculiarly suited to man's nature, than the rest; I should not hesitate to conclude, that it was a state, which lay still before us; one, at which we had not yet fully arrived; not one, which we had long since left behind us; that Golden age, which never yet existed

but in the Poets fancy, if ever it is to have a more real existence, being still reserved for distant posterity.

Of what a very whimsical and capricious nature must happiness be in their opinion, who suppose, that as soon as mankind began to open their eyes, and look at it, it should vanish and disappear!

But men may make whatever suppositions their fancy leads them to; and they may have a right of calling these suppositions, which are the genuine offspring of their own brain, by whatever names they choose. They may therefore, if they please, call that of the Savage, the state of nature: and there may be some, unworthy of a better state, who may think, they could have been happier in that, than they are in their present situation. The man, who by his vices has violated his conscience; and who, besides the inward uneasiness arising from thence, finds himself embarrassed with many outward inconveniences; may with some reason envy even the child, who is yet in full possession of his innocence; and who is therefore intirely unacquainted with those ills, which the loss of it has made the other feel. — But surely it does not therefore follow,
that

that perpetual childhood was designed to be, either the true state of nature, or of man's greatest happiness. The child, it is probable, is either, for want of thought, insensible of his happiness; or, if he thinks, he will in consequence of that, eagerly press forward to what he is led to believe, will be the happier state of manhood.

There is besides no doubt to be made, but that every state, and every different mode of existence, in which it might have pleased our gracious Creator to place us, would contain in it more happiness, than misery, enough to make it a blessing: this, infinite wisdom might have contrived a thousand different ways, unknown to us: we might, and undoubtedly should have been happy, had God given us fewer faculties, and those of less perfection, than what his kinder bounty has bestowed: but then this would not have been the happiness of such Beings, as we are; it would not have been the happiness of such a particular class of rational creatures, as we belong to.

And it is exceedingly clear, call it by what name you will, that state could never be designed for any Being to continue in, which respects but half it's nature, and that too the worst.

worst. Surely if there must needs be an exclusion made, the inferior should give place, and our greatest attention be paid to that, which most deserves it.

But the true state for any Being to enjoy happiness in, must be such an one, as gives him an opportunity of exercising all his faculties, and of satisfying all his desires. If a Being is of a compound nature, that state, in which the several parts of this composition are consulted, and bear their proper share of employment, is the natural state for such a being to be happy in. If, lastly, one part of this Being's nature is so formed, as to be capable of an increase of perfection, from the mere exertion of it's own inherent powers; it must of consequence follow, that the happiness of such a Being will be in a state of continual progression from less to greater: and this will hold true of man, whether it is applied to the species at large, or to each separate individual; at least, if we stop any where short of diseased and feeble old age.

The examination however of this matter in every particular instance would be an inquiry of too great extent for the present undertaking. But let any one, who is inclined to dispute the truth of this assertion,
if

if he is at all advanced beyond the giddy stage of youth, only just ask himself seriously, how far he could wish to be carried backward in the course he has run, in order to go it over again, in the same manner, he had done before; and he will soon find, how very small a part, of what is past, is equal to his present condition, be that almost what it will. What is apt to lead people into mistakes in this instance, is, that they remember much better what gave them pleasure, than what gave them pain. — But though there may be many scenes of past life, which, could one have them independently of what went before, or followed after, a man might be glad to act over again. Yet who, that reflects upon the many follies he has been guilty of, and the number of difficulties they have thrown him into; what a silly empty thing he was for many years; the phane of every puff and gust of passion; a mere *pipe*, not only *for fortune's finger* (as the Poet has it) but for the finger of every knave *to stop what note he pleased upon*, — would wish to be again the same fool and dupe he has been? As soon might the ship-wrecked mariner, now safe upon the beach, wish to be again the sport of those winds and waves, which had already buffeted

buffeted him so much! — I would venture to say, that the single satisfaction of looking back upon the dangers we have escaped, of knowing a little more what we are, and of seeing a little better into what people about us are doing, (which are all things, that the *anni euntes*, or *fleeting years*, are sure to leave behind them, whatever else they may rob us of,) will more than equal, of itself, without any other circumstances, (many however of which might be added,) all the loss we sustain by advancing forward in this mortal course. and what is true of each individual, that his life will be happier, as he advances in years, and grows more rational, is true also of the world at large; which in every other instance may be justly compared to a single person, except in this, that it can never feel the inconveniences of old age, but is perpetually renewed in strength and vigor.

So little reason * then is there to lament the decline of human happiness, or to pity those, who are yet to be born to greater misery

* Notwithstanding what Mr. Rousseau in his ingenious manner says to the contrary, — ‘ Il y a, je le sens, un âge auquel l’homme individuel voudroit s’arrêter; tu chercheras l’âge auquel tu désirerois que ton espece se fut arrêtée. Mécontent de ton

sery, than we suffer; that we may well congratulate ourselves on the high degree of perfection, to which the world has been advanced in our days; and may rather envy those, whom with our fortunes and our honors we shall leave to be heirs also of greater happiness.

Let no one however be afraid, lest upon this plan the growth of human happiness should be such in time, as to rob heaven of it's votaries:—there will always be difference enough, — enough to animate the warmest wishes and to kindle the eagerest desires, — between what is perfect, and what is imperfect; — what, with a thousand other abatements, can last but for a few fleeting years, — and what, with every other circumstance that can recommend it to our choice, will continue for ever.

ton état present, par des raisons qui annoncent à ta postérité malheureuse de plus grands mécontentemens encore peut-être voudrois tu pouvoir rétrograder; et ce sentiment doit faire l'eloge de tes premiers ayeux, la critique de tes contemporains, et l'effroi de ceux, qui auront le malheur de vivre après toi."

The End of the third Part.



ADVERTISEMENT.

PARTS the IVth and Vth of this **ESTIMATE OF COMPARISON** (in which the Author proposes to consider the state of *Morality* at different periods of the world, and to bring the whole down to our *own Times and Circumstances*) will be published some time next Winter.

ILLUSTRATIONS

MRS. HOMER'S ESSAY

CONTAINING

LIBERTY AND NECESSITY

BY THE

MR. G. C. GORDON



LONDON:

PRINTED BY J. JOHNSON, IN ALBEMARLE STREET, AND SOLD BY

